Pace Law Review
Volume 36
Issue 2 Winter 2016

Article 4

April 2016

Circuit Splits and Empiricism in the Supreme Court
Karen M. Gebbia
Golden Gate University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Karen M. Gebbia, Circuit Splits and Empiricism in the Supreme Court, 36 Pace L. Rev. 477 (2016)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Circuit Splits and Empiricism in
the Supreme Court
Karen M. Gebbia1
I.

Introduction: A Brief Introduction to Empiricism and the
Supreme Court

Fire sweeps through an old growth forest of sequoia, sugar
pine and white fir trees. In the years following the conflagration,
an observer notices significantly more seedlings growing in
severely burned areas than in unburned areas. Why? Is there
more space, more water, or more sun in the burned areas? Has
the fire, itself, facilitated new growth? Could it be random
chance?
Might rigorous comparative studies yield an
explanation?
This not entirely fictional tale2 embodies the essence of
empiricism. It begins with an observation, identifies hypotheses
that might plausibly explain the observation, and sets about
testing these hypotheses through rigorously controlled factual
1. Associate Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law,
formerly Professor of Law, University of Hawaii School of Law; JD cum laude
Georgetown University Law Center.
The author thanks Professors Robert Calhoun, Helen Hartnell, Susan Rutberg,
Jon Sylvester, attendees at two Golden Gate Colloquia, and anonymous
reviewers for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts. Thanks are also due
to Elizabeth Cinque, Class of 2013, and Francisco Martinez, Class of 2017, for
dedicated research assistance and unfailing good cheer.
Endless thanks to James M. Barrett, PhD, University of California, Davis, for
help translating concepts into recognizable statistics and patient tutoring in
the intricate oddities of STATA. The statistical analyses in the Study also
benefited from insights garnered from Professors Lee Epstein and Andrew D.
Martin at the Conducting Empirical Legal Scholarship Workshop, May 2013,
at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law, and Professors
Robert Lawless, Jennifer Robbennolt and Thomas Ulen in their book
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW.
See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL
METHODS IN LAW (Wolters Kluwer 2010). Any errors are the author’s own and
no reflection of the brilliance of the coaches.
2. See, e.g., Bruce M. Kilgore, Fire’s Role in a Sequoia Forest, NATIONAL
PARKS SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/seki/naturescience/fic_firerole.htm (last
visited Dec. 16, 2015).
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analysis, rather than settling for even the most sophisticated
theoretical explanation.3
Empiricism, however, can explain far more than the natural
world. In the past two decades, legal scholars have increasingly
employed empirical methods to probe how the legal system’s
central actors and institutions function in practice, rather than
merely in theory.4 Empiricism may add distinct value to
traditional legal scholarship by testing the validity of theorized
expectations and identifying trends, patterns and nuances in
courts’ and legislatures’ decision making processes.
Consider, for example, Supreme Court review.
The
dynamics of the review process fundamentally shape the Court’s
role in fostering the legal system’s essential values5; however,
3. See LAWLESS, supra note 1, at 7-20; Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules
of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1-3, 19-20 (2002).
4. See, for example, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL
RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010), for
commentary recognizing the increasing amount of self-consciously empirical
work in legal scholarship. See LAWLESS, supra note 1, at xix (noting increase
in empirical legal scholarship); see also Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins,
Nature and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns,
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1713-19 (2011) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Origins]
(tracing the development of empirical legal scholarship); Theodore Eisenberg,
Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1741, 1741-42
(2004) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Why] (noting increase in empirical legal
scholarship); Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical
Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 527-29 (2000) (noting increase in empirical legal
scholarship); Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 1-2 (same; also urging scholars
to follow the rules of inference, defining empirical scholarship broadly to
include much of what others might define as traditional scholarship); Michael
Heise, An Empirical Analysis of Empirical Legal Scholarship Production,
1990-2009, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739 passim (2011) (noting increase in
empirical legal scholarship); Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction: The
Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1195 passim (2013) (noting
increase in empirical legal scholarship); see generally sources cited infra note
7.
5. Elsewhere, the author has identified eight essential values that
underlie the legal system: that the law shall be predictable in individual cases,
replicable in similar cases, horizontally coherent across related fields of law,
vertically coherent across time, reflective of society’s needs and values,
responsive to changes in society’s needs and values, influential in shaping
social values or morals, and fair and just in individual cases. See Karen M.
Gebbia, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System
Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233 (1997). See also sources cited supra note
4. Cf. Frank B. Cross & Dain C. Donelson, Creating Quality Courts, 7 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 490, 491 (2010) (articulating important qualities of
judicial systems, including that: “The judiciary should be independent . . . . The

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4

2

2016

CIRCUIT SPLITS AND EMPIRICISM

479

multiple factors influence each aspect of the process, including
litigants’ initial determination to request review, the framing of
the issues presented, the Justices’ decision whether to accept the
case, and the Justices’ individual votes on the merits.
Consequently, the Court’s (theoretical) power of final review is
continually balanced against the (practical) reality that
litigants’ selection discretion significantly constrains Supreme
Court review, and the Court’s own limited docket prevents it
from reviewing every case the lower courts decide.
Scholars have explored diverse and interrelated aspects of
Supreme Court review, including: the rich variety of roles the
Court plays (including correcting errors, resolving circuit splits,
fostering uniformity, resolving constitutional questions, and
signaling other actors); the dynamics of the certiorari process
(including litigants’ decisions to seek certiorari, the Court’s
decision to grant certiorari, work load considerations, and
messages the Court’s choices send lower courts);6 and the ways
judiciary should be accessible . . . . The judiciary should be reasonably efficient
and effective. . . All these features are part of establishing a ‘rule of law.’”);
Reid Hastie, The Challenge to Produce Useful ‘Legal Numbers,’ 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 6, 7 (2011) (articulating the “desired, normative properties of legal
numbers” as reliability, equity, accuracy, predictability, and justice).
Commentators may disagree on how the values that define a legal system
ought to be balanced, or allocated among the players in the legal system;
nevertheless, empirical study enhances understanding of how legal
institutions actually pursue these aspirations.
6. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE US COURTS OF
APPEALS (Standford Univ. Press 2007) (examining factors influencing appellate
decision making); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (examining
decision making on certiorari); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2002) (examining ideological impacts on Supreme Court decision
making); Gregory Caldeira et al., Sophisticated Voting and Gate-Keeping in the
Supreme Court, 15 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 549 (1999) (considering Supreme Court
decision making in granting certiorari); Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic
Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme
Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 103 (2000) (considering
factors affecting the Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant certiorari);
Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 369 (2005) (examining why lower courts adhere to Supreme Court
precedent); Paul H. Edelman et al., Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the
Supreme Court, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129 (2012) (examining whether
ideology and the attitudinal model of decision making explain Supreme Court
consensus); Paul H. Edelman et al., Measuring Deviations from Expected
Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819 (2008)
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in which broad models of judicial decision making illuminate the
Court’s and litigants’ decisions (including the effects of
attitudinal, institutional and legal factors, and of appellate

(examining factors that might explain Supreme Court Justices’ deviations from
voting behavior that would be expected if one applied the attitudinal model of
judicial decision making); Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme
Court Justices: Who, When, and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483
(2007) (examining implications of ideological change on the Supreme Court);
Ward Farnsworth, The Use and Limits of Martin-Quinn Scores to Access
Supreme Court Justices, With Special Attention to the Problem of Ideological
Drift, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1891 (2007) (examining measures of Supreme Court
Justices’ ideology and the implications of ideological change); Tracey E. George
& Michael E. Solamine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts
of Appeals En Banc, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 171 (2001) (considering whether the
Supreme Court is any more or less likely to consider circuit court decisions
heard en banc rather than by a panel); Bernard Grofman & Timothy Brazill,
Identifying the Median Justice on the Supreme Court Through
Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953-1991, 112 PUB.
CHOICE 55 (2002) (examining Supreme Court decision making); Jonathan P.
Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, Case Selection and the Study of Judicial Politics, 5
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 407 (2008) (considering how case selection affects
inferences regarding judicial politics, including regarding Supreme Court
decision making and lower court compliance with Supreme Court signals);
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (2007)
(challenging the “principal-agent” theory of lower court compliance with
Supreme Court policy making); David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of
Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
579 (2003) (examining whether lower courts comply with Supreme Court
signals to avoid reversal); Maxwell Mak et al., Is Certiorari Contingent on
Litigant Behavior? Petitioners’ Role in Strategic Auditing, 10 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 54 (2013) (exploring inter-dependence between litigant selection
discretion and Supreme Court selection discretion); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin
M. Quinn, Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 365 (2007) (examining implications of ideological change on the
Supreme Court); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (exploring, in a classic work, the
implications of litigants’ decision making in selecting cases for litigation); Rorie
Spill Solberg & Stephanie A. Lindquist, Activism, Ideology, and Federalism:
Judicial Behavior in Constitutional Challenges Before the Rehnquist Court,
1986-2000, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 237 (2006) (examining the impact of
Supreme Court Justices’ ideology on voting regarding constitutional challenges
to legislation); Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a
Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 673 (1994) (examining circuit court response to Supreme Court
signals and directives); Jeff Yates et al., Judicial Ideology and the Selection of
Disputes for US Supreme Court Adjudication, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 847
(2013) (examining the relationship between the attitudinal model of judicial
decision making on the Supreme Court and the effects of selection discretion
by litigants and the Court).
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panel composition and Court composition).7
Traditional legal scholarship and empirical legal
scholarship8 each contribute to our understanding of the
7. See sources cited supra note 6; see generally MICHAEL A. BAILEY &
FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (Princeton Univ. Press 2011) (challenging the
adequacy of the attitudinal model to explain judicial decision making); SEGAL
& SPAETH, supra note 6 (exploring and comparing rival models of judicial
decision making, including the attitudinal model and refinements to it);
Pauline T. Kim, Beyond Principal-Agent Theories: Law and the Judicial
Hierarchy, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 535 (2011) (noting how institutional models of
decision making, including principal-agent models, improve upon simple
attitudinal models, but challenging the ability of principal-agent models to
account for legal norms); Michael A. Perino, Law, Ideology, and Strategy in
Judicial Decision Making: Evidence from Securities Fraud Actions, 3 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 497, 497-98 (2006) (identifying the three predominant
theories of judicial decision making as “legal,” “attitudinal,” and “strategic;”
exploring how well these models describe decision making in securities
litigation); Keren Weinshall-Margel, Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional Models
of Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective
From Israel, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 556, 556-65 (2011) (comparing legal,
attitudinal, rational choice, and neo-institutional models; applying these
models to contrast the high courts’ decision making in the United States and
Israel). Cf. Paresh Kumar Narayan & Russell Smyth, What Explains Dissent
on the High Court of Australia? An Empirical Assessment Using a
Cointegration and Error Correction Approach, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 401
(2007) (examining how institutional, socio-economic and stylistic factors affect
dissent on Australia’s high court). There is also a growing body of work
examining the interaction between ideology and panel composition on the
courts of appeal. See, e.g., Carlos Berdejo, Is it the Journey or the Destination?:
Judicial Preferences and Decision-Making in the Ninth Circuit, 51 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 271 (2013) (examining the effects of ideology and panel
composition in the Ninth Circuit); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting
on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L . REV. 301
(2004) (examining the effect of panel composition on ideological voting in the
appellate courts).
8. In this Article, “empirical legal scholarship” is distinguished from
“traditional legal scholarship” by the presence (in the former) of self-conscious
factual investigation and experimentation using controlled and comprehensive
data (rather than solely theory, anecdote and example), to test theoretical
explanations of observed phenomena. It is not essential to this definition that
statistical analysis is employed (although it often will be necessary to explain
the relationships among variables or the significance of observed differences
among datasets), or that inference be drawn (although it, too, will be necessary
to any study that seeks to draw broader inferences from specific observed
phenomena). Cf. LAWLESS, supra note 1, at 7 (“By the term empirical methods
we mean, at the most general level, all techniques for systematically gathering,
describing, and critically analyzing data (objective information about the
world.”) (emphasis in original); Eisenberg, Origins, supra note 4, at 1719 (“ELS
scholars use tools that have long been used in and out of law schools. ELS
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complex interactions among these variables and the dynamic
relationship between the Court and the circuit courts of appeal.9
Legal scholarship often seeks to go beyond illumination,
however. It has the potential, indeed often forthright objective,
of influencing policy-making and driving institutional reform.10
Empirical study, in particular, carries an aura of almost
scientific veracity that policy makers may find harder to
discount than even the most persuasive theory. It is particularly
critical, therefore, that empirical studies proceed from rigorous,
valid, and reliable foundations by applying accurate data to test
employs a methodology that is usually, but not always, the methodology of
statistical analysis--parts of which are used by most scholars with a social
scientific interest in legal issues.”); Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 1-2
(defining empirical scholarship broadly to include any research that involves
learning about the world using quantitative data or qualitative information;
noting that “[t]he word ‘empirical’ denotes evidence about the world based on
observation or experience;” and arguing that legal scholars have been
“conducting research that is empirical – that is, learning about the world using
quantitative data or qualitative information – for almost as long as they have
been conducting research”); Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical,
26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 810 (1999) (limiting his discussion of “empirical legal
scholarship” to work that applies statistical analysis to describe or draw
inferences regarding larger samples); Craig Nard, Empirical Legal
Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and the
Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 349 (1995) (describing empirical
research as generally involving statistical analysis).
9. This Article focuses on the Court’s review of court of appeals decisions,
which constitute the largest part of the Court’s docket, and give rise to the
empirical concerns this Article addresses.
10. See, e.g., UCLA-RAND Center For Law & Public Policy, UCLA LAW
(2015) https://www.law.ucla.edu/centers/interdisciplinary-studies/ucla-randcenter-for-law-and-public-policy/about/ (“The UCLA-RAND Center for Law
and Public Policy produces legal scholarship grounded in multidisciplinary
empirical analysis to guide legal and public policymakers in the 21st century.”);
Eisenberg, Why, supra note 4, at 1743-46 (noting public policy interest in
empirical legal studies). As Epstein and King explain:
[L]egal scholarship – perhaps to a greater degree and more
immediately than most other research – has the potential to
influence public policy as it is promulgated by judges,
legislators, and bureaucrats. It is especially so when that
influence comes in studies assessing the likely consequences
of particular changes in public policy, evaluating the impact
of existing public programs, or affecting the real world in a
timely manner.
Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
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carefully constructed hypotheses.
This Article demonstrates, empirically rather than merely
in theory, how a failure to do so leads to unreliable conclusions
concerning the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
circuit courts of appeal. Specifically, commentators routinely
misapply facially accurate raw data regarding the rate at which
the Court reverses circuit court decisions to support unreliable
conclusions regarding the comparative degree of accord between
the Court and individual circuits. Commentators and the
popular press then employ these unreliable conclusions to draw
unsupported inferences regarding the reasons for supposed
discord between the Court and the circuits, and to urge
fundamental institutional reforms ranging from dividing
circuits to creating intermediate levels of judicial review.11
Part II of this Article provides context for this Study by
reviewing the principal ways in which empiricists employ raw
data and inquiry-based analysis to study Supreme Court review
practices. Part III examines how raw data and inquiry-based
analysis apply to the question of Supreme Court / circuit court
accord, explains how circuit splits and other factors affect
apparent rates of accord, and distinguishes simple Supreme
Court case disposition data (“affirm / reverse” rates, which do
not account for circuit splits) from more comprehensive “approve
/ abrogate” rates (which do account for circuit splits). Part IV
defines the two datasets this Article uses to compare affirm /
reverse rates to approve / abrogate rates, and outlines the
methods and parameters of the Study. Part V elaborates the
Study’s findings regarding the differences between affirm /
reverse rates and approve / abrogate rates, demonstrates that
affirm / reverse rates do not reliably reflect the degree to which
the Court agrees with the circuit courts of appeal, either in the
aggregate, or on a circuit-by-circuit comparative basis, and
considers what these data suggest about other variables, such as
issue disparity, that may fundamentally impact Supreme Court
/ circuit court accord. Part VI summarizes these conclusions,
makes recommendations regarding the interpretation and
application of Supreme Court review data, and identifies areas
for further study.
11. See infra nn. 69-74.
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II. Empirical Perspectives on the Supreme Court
Empirical analysis of the Supreme Court follows two
primary paths. The first reports comprehensive raw data; the
second engages in inquiry-based analysis. Part II of this Article
summarizes and considers the intersections between raw data
reports (Part II.A) and inquiry-based analysis (Part II.B), in the
context of empirical study of the Supreme Court.
A.

Raw Data Reports

Raw data publishers strive to make accurate information
regarding Supreme Court decision making available to scholars
and the public. To do so, they first identify potentially
interesting variables regarding Supreme Court cases (and
perhaps regarding petitions filed with the Court). Variables
might include, for example, the case’s origin, nature of the
issues, disposition of the case, voting coalitions, opinion author,
etc. Raw data reporters then compile these data and publish
them in summary reports or searchable databases.12
The complexity of the data-reporting enterprise depends on
the nature of the variables reported, the degree of analysis and
decision making required to assign values to the reported
variables (i.e., to “code”13 them), and the reporting format (such
as whether the compiler reports individual case data or
aggregate Term data).
12. See, e.g., databases discussed infra Part II.A; see generally LAWLESS,
supra note 1, at 7, 125-38 (discussing availability of and access to public and
archival data); Epstein & King, supra note 3, at 22-24 (commenting on the
practice by which large amounts of data are made publically available for
general research rather than developed in response to a particular inquiry).
13. See generally LAWLESS, supra note 1, at 165-87 (noting the challenges
of coding variables in empirical legal studies); see also Michael Evans et al.,
Recounting the Courts? Applying Automated Content Analysis to Enhance
Empirical Legal Research, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1007, 1008-09 (2007)
(noting the tension between large-scale inquiry of “thin,” reliably coded
observations and small-scale inquiry of more nuanced variables that present
greater coding challenges); Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil
Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60
(2013) (advocating mandatory party coding of case-related variables in all
federal filings to enhance civil rulemaking).
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Variables that may be reported based upon generally noncontroversial coding decisions include numbers of petitions for
certiorari filed and granted, numbers of cases resolved with and
without opinion, numbers of merits cases decided, origin of
cases,14 simple case disposition,15 opinion author, vote splits,
voting alignments, and the like. Harvard Law Review16 and
SCOTUSBlog17 produce the most well-recognized summaries of
these types of Supreme Court decision making data.18 Each
publishes an annual report that summarizes these data for the
Court’s most recently completed Term (the former since the 1948

14. SCOTUSBlog reports case origin in four categories: circuit courts of
appeal, state supreme courts, three judge district courts, and original
jurisdiction. See generally SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com (last
visited Dec. 16, 2015) [hereinafter SCOTUSBlog]; Statistics, SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com/statistics/
[hereinafter
SCOTUSBlog
Statistics]. HARVARD LAW REVIEW reports sixteen categories of case origin:
district courts, armed forces, state courts, and each of the thirteen circuit
courts of appeal. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2012 Term: The Statistics, 127
HARV. L. REV. 408, 418 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 Term].
15. Simple case disposition includes affirmed, reversed, vacated,
remanded, and the like.
16. Each November since 1949, HARVARD LAW REVIEW has published
statistics for the previous Supreme Court Term. See The Supreme Court, 2004
Term: The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415 n.1 (2005) (noting history of
the statistics issue) [hereinafter 2004 Term]. The most recent report is
available at 2012 Term, supra note 14.
17. SCOTUSBlog Statistics, supra note 14.
18. See also Supreme Court Database, infra note 40 and text
accompanying notes 41– 44, which reports these same variables, as well as
extensive additional variables.
Other sources of various Supreme Court data include: LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS (5th ed.
2012);
Journal,
SUPREME
COURT
(Dec.
15,
2015),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/journal.aspx (“The Journal reflects the
disposition of each case, names the court whose judgment is under review, lists
the cases argued that day and the attorneys who presented oral argument . .
.”); Judicial Business 2013 Tables, US COURTS (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2013/statistical-tablesus-supreme-court.aspx (setting forth cases on docket, disposed of, and
remaining on docket at conclusion of October Terms for the most recent fiveyear period; also summarizing for each Term, the numbers of cases argued,
disposed of by full opinion, disposed of by per curiam decisions, set for reargument, granted review, reviewed and decided without oral argument, and
available for argument at the outset of the following term); THE UNITED STATES
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0331.pdf
(setting
forth, at Table 331, Supreme Court Cases filed and disposition, 1980 to 2010).
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Term;19 the latter since the 1995 Term20). Where it seems useful,
each publishes data both in the aggregate and disaggregated by
circuit.21
Although these resources refer to their reports as
“statistics,” as a matter of common parlance, the reports actually
comprise raw totals or percentages for specified variables,
without comparative statistical analysis, which might account
for factors such as sample size, weight, probability, significance
and the like. The distinction may be important. For example,
suppose that for a particular period, the Supreme Court agreed
with the circuit courts of appeal, in the aggregate, on average,
around 45% of the time, but agreed with the Tenth Circuit
around 53% of the time during this same period. One might be
tempted to ask why the Tenth Circuit has a better record. The
first inquiry, however, must be whether the seeming difference
is statistically meaningful given the numbers of cases
considered. In this example, the difference has no greater
significance than random chance.22
Harvard Law Review and SCOTUSBlog also identify the
types of cases the Court has decided on the merits, which is a
somewhat more substantive variable than those mentioned
above. The extent to which classification based upon the nature
of a case presents coding challenges depends on the complexity
of the issues and the specificity of the chosen taxonomy.
SCOTUSBlog reports four categories of merits cases, namely:
civil, criminal, habeas corpus, and original jurisdiction.23
Harvard Law Review reports six subject matter categories for
cases disposed of with full opinions, namely: civil cases from the
federal courts, federal criminal cases, federal habeas corpus
cases, civil cases from the state courts, state criminal cases, and
19. The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HARV. L. REV. 119 (1949); see 2004
Term, supra note 16, at 415 n.1 (noting history of the statistics issue).
20. SCOTUSBlog Statistics, supra note 14 (including reports for the 1995
through 2013 Terms).
21. See sources cited supra note 14.
22. See infra Table III, Figure 8, and accompanying text.
23. See SCOTUSBlog Statistics, supra note 14 (reporting “make up of the
merits docket” beginning with the 2010 Term; reporting “questions presented
and results” for the 2008 and 2009 Terms on a case-by-case but not summary
basis; reporting a “case list” with “holdings” but not issues for the 2007 Term;
and not reporting a nature of the case summary for earlier Terms).
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cases within the Court’s original jurisdiction.24 Placing cases
into the broad categories these reports employ does not typically
require controversial coding decisions.
The breadth of these categories may, however, be somewhat
unsatisfactory to a researcher interested in exploring either a
narrower subset of cases (e.g., all taxation or bankruptcy
questions), or a broader group of cases that crosses categories
(e.g., all constitutional questions). Harvard Law Review
separates its six broad categories into subcategories based upon
the statute, rule, constitutional provision, or legal doctrine
presented.25 Because the Court typically issues fewer than
eighty decisions per Term, and typically does not review
multiple cases presenting similar issues, this level of taxonomy
often reports a single case observation in many of the subject
matter subcategories.26 For example, in the category of “federal
criminal” cases, Harvard Law Review employs five
subcategories, each with one case observation, to describe the
2005 Term cases,27 and nine subcategories, each with one case
observation, to describe the 2012 Term cases.28 Separately, it
identifies eight subcategories of “federal habeas corpus” cases for
the 2005 Term (one with four case observations),29 and seven for
the 2012 Term (two with two case observations).30 SCOTUSBlog

24. See, e.g., 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 420-22.
25. For example, the October 2012 Term Report identifies six “state
criminal cases” (comprising one double jeopardy, four search and seizure, and
one self-incrimination case) and nine federal habeas corpus cases (comprising
one case addressing each of five separate issues, rules, or laws, and two cases
addressing each of two other issues, rules, or laws). Id. at 422.
26. For example, for the seventy-eight decisions reported for the October
2012 Term, HARVARD LAW REVIEW creates sixty-two subcategories, only
thirteen of which have more than one case reported (eleven subcategories
record two cases each, one subcategory records three cases, and one
subcategory records four cases). Id. at 420-22.
27. The Supreme Court, 2005 Term: The Statistics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372,
384 (2006) [hereinafter 2005 Term] (categorizing cases as federal criminal
procedure, right to counsel, search and seizure, speedy trial act, and statutory
interpretation).
28. 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 422 (categorizing cases as Armed Career
Criminal Act, ex post facto, federal conspiracy law, federal rules of criminal
procedure, Hobbs Act, plain error review, right to jury trial, search and seizure,
and Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act).
29. 2005 Term, supra note 27.
30. 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 422.
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does not subcategorize beyond the four broad categories noted;
however, it does separately accord each merits decision its own
case page.31
Any taxonomy that classifies cases into narrow categories
offers users the flexibility of selecting, refining, and aggregating
data suitable to their individual inquiries. Nevertheless, in even
the most well-constructed taxonomy, increasing specificity
simultaneously increases subjectivity at at least two levels.
First, reasonable coders might create different taxonomies (in
general or for different purposes). For example, one person
might classify civil cases according to whether they present
questions of federal or state law, while two others might apply
doctrinal categories, but at different levels of specificity (e.g.,
commercial law, as compared to commercial transactions,
consumer protection, real property, corporations, bankruptcy,
etc.). Second, reasonable coders might make different coding
decisions with respect to individual cases, particularly if those
cases present multiple issues or the interaction of legal
doctrines. For example, a case presenting an interaction
between the Bankruptcy Code and state probate law might be
classified as civil, probate, bankruptcy, supremacy clause,
federalism, constitutional, all of the above, or perhaps something
else.32
The more subjective the coding decisions become, the
greater care end users must exercise in selecting the cases or
categories to be studied, precisely defining their selection
criteria, and fully appreciating the coding decisions the reporters
have made. Consider two more or less random illustrations of
the types of errors that might otherwise arise.
First, a bankruptcy expert might consider three of the
31. See SCOTUSBlog, supra note 14.
32. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (presenting these
tensions); Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (presenting these
tensions). See Christina L. Boyd et al., Building a Taxonomy of Litigation:
Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 253 (2013) (exploring taxonomy generally in varied legal contexts and
considering how lawsuits might be classified); Evans, supra note 13 (exploring
the use of automated text classification to enhance consistency in coding the
content of legal texts); Jonathan P. Kastellec, The Statistical Analysis of
Judicial Decisions and Legal Rules with Classification Trees, 7 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 202 (2010) (applying decision trees to categorize and illuminate
legal reasoning).
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Supreme Court’s 2005 Term cases to be bankruptcy cases,
namely: Marshall v. Marshall,33 Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz,34 and Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich
American Insurance Company.35
Each at least arguably
implicates non-bankruptcy concerns as well. Harvard Law
Review, in comparison, reports only two “bankruptcy” cases
among fifty-one “civil cases from the federal courts” during the
2005 Term.36 The report does not identify the cases by name,
and reasonable people making an educated guess might disagree
on which of these three cases is most logically classified as
something other than a bankruptcy case. Consequently, a
researcher using this report would need to inquire further and
hope to locate a more detailed explanation of the coding
decision.37 Moreover, a researcher interested in engaging in
statistical analysis of the Court’s bankruptcy cases over some
period of years might simply miss one of the three 2005 Term
“bankruptcy” cases if the researcher had not: first,
independently determined that there ought to be three
bankruptcy cases in the 2005 Term; second, compared her own
determination to the determination the compilers of the 2005
Term report made; and finally, made an affirmative choice
33. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (holding that the “probate
exception” does not deprive the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction over debtor’s
tort suit against a third party).
34. Cent. VA Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (holding that state
agencies’ sovereign immunity does not preclude bankruptcy trustee’s
preference action against the agencies).
35. Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651 (2006)
(holding that unpaid workers’ compensation insurance premiums were not
contributions to an employee benefit plan for purposes of priority under 11
U.S.C. § 507).
36. See 2005 Term, supra note 27, at 382.
37. In comparison, SCOTUSBlog presumably would classify each of these
cases as “civil litigation” (rather than criminal, habeas corpus, or original
jurisdiction) under its current classification scheme. See infra Table III, Figure
8, and accompanying text. In 2005, it did not summarize cases by “nature of
the case.” It did, however, provide a link to a summary report prepared by the
Georgetown Supreme Court Institute. See GEO. U. L. CTR FINAL SUP. CT. INST.,
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM 2005 OVERVIEW,
http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com/movabletype/archives/GULCSupCtInstituteFin
alReportOT2005_30June06.pdf (listing Katz and Howard as bankruptcy cases,
and Marshall as a federal civil procedure case). See also Karl Blanke, The
Numbers,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
29,
2006,
4:09
PM),
http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com/2006/06/the-numbers/.
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whether to include two or three 2005 Term bankruptcy cases in
her study.
Similarly, replicability challenges may arise if different
reporting resources make different coding decisions.
For
example, Harvard Law Review reports nine federal habeas
corpus cases in its table of federal criminal cases disposed of with
full opinions during the October 2012 Term.38 SCOTUSBlog, in
comparison, reports six habeas corpus cases on the merits docket
in the October 2012 Term.39 Separately, SCOTUSBlog provides
detailed case pages that might, or might not, allow a careful
researcher to determine which cases it has included in the six.40
If similar disparities existed over many years in these summary
reports, a researcher amalgamating two decades worth of
habeas corpus data (for example) could reach apparently
different (non-replicable) conclusions depending on which source
she employed and whether she undertook to reconcile apparent
conflicts.
These examples illustrate why end users must review the
reporter’s coding decisions carefully, even with respect to
apparently straightforward variables, such as the nature of the
case.
Other substantive coding decisions may present
significantly greater nuance than subject matter taxonomy and,
therefore, even greater need for care by both compilers and
users. These data might include, for example, reasons the Court
accepted the case, determinative legal provisions, qualitative
characterization of the decision and its direction, and the like.41
38. See 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 422.
39. See Make-Up of the Merits Docket, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013),
http://SCOTUSBlog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/makeup_OT12.pdf.
40. One might attempt to deduce the rationale underlying the coding
taxonomy differences by comparing the issues reported on each of the seventyodd individual SCOTUSBlog case pages for that Term to the seven subcategories of issues HARVARD LAW REVIEW identifies as federal habeas corpus
cases (namely, AEDPA, AEDPA deference, competency, confrontation clause,
federal rules of appellate procedure, retroactivity, right to counsel).
Again in comparison, the Supreme Court Database identifies only three habeas
corpus cases (one having two issues, and therefore being reported as two
observations) under its “issue” variable for the 2012 Term. See discussion infra
at text accompanying notes 41-42. It records two additional cases as
presenting “ineffective counsel” issues. See THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE,
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Supreme Court Database].
41. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, for example, reports whether decisions were
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The Supreme Court Database,42 which has served as an essential
resource for many empirical studies, is the principal,
authoritative resource for these more nuanced and
comprehensive types of data.43
The Supreme Court Database was conceived and developed
by Harold Spaeth, who became a lawyer after many years as a
political science professor and scholar.44
Other leading
empiricists subsequently expanded and enhanced the Supreme
Court Database. This database codes and reports nearly 250
variables, include multiple variables concerning case
identification, chronology, origin, jurisdictional basis, reasons
the Court accepted the case, nature of the substantive issues,
governing law, direction, outcome, voting, and the like, for each
Supreme Court case decided during and since the 1946 Term.45
The Supreme Court Database differs from the Harvard Law
Review and SCOTUSBlog summary reports in several ways.
Substantively, it records a significantly greater number of
variables, many of which are more subjective than those

in favor of or against the government. See, e.g., 2012 Term, supra note 14, at
422.
42. See Supreme Court Database, supra note 40.
43. See infra note 44.
44. Harold Spaeth, PhD University of Cincinnati (political science), JD
University of Michigan, serves as Research Professor of Law and Emeritus
Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. See Harold J.
Spaeth, Emeriti Faculty, DEPT. OF POL. SCI., MICH. ST. U. (2005),
http://polisci.msu.edu/index.php/people/emeriti-faculty.
45. See Supreme Court Database, supra note 40, at “About” section, noting
that the database contains:
247 pieces of information for each case, roughly broken down
into six categories: (1) identification variables (e.g., citations
and docket numbers); (2) background variables (e.g., how the
Court took jurisdiction, origin and source of the case, the
reason the Court agreed to decide it); (3) chronological
variables (e.g., the date of decision, term of Court, natural
court); (4) substantive variables (e.g., legal provisions, issues,
direction of decision); (5) outcome variables (e.g., disposition
of the case, winning party, formal alteration of precedent,
declaration of unconstitutionality); and (6) voting and opinion
variables (e.g., how the individual justices voted, their
opinions and interagreements).
Id.
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reported by the other compilers. The database format is also
dramatically different than the by-Term summary snapshots
Harvard Law Review and SCOTUSBlog offer.
Snapshot
summaries allow users to compare or aggregate cases across
Terms, but only within the categories reported. The Supreme
Court Database, in contrast, does not summarize data by Term
or otherwise. Rather, it presents its raw data in a traditional
spreadsheet format. Researchers using the database are free to
create their own data compilations by selecting the variables
relevant to their own specific inquiries (such as particular years,
issues, courts, justices, etc., or any combination thereof).
The Supreme Court Database provides a variety of tools that
enable researchers to retrieve data within the parameters of
their inquiries. In the past, researchers using the Supreme
Court Database typically manipulated and analyzed their
chosen data using a traditional statistical analysis interface
(such as STATA or SAS). More recently, the Supreme Court
Database developed an interface that is more intuitive and userfriendly for scholars who are familiar with standard search
engine technology (such as Google), but are not practiced in
statistical analysis.
For example, without engaging in
“statistical analysis,” a user can easily generate and compare
lists of, say, all habeas corpus cases and criminal non-habeas
corpus cases decided on the merits during selected Supreme
Court Terms.
Despite their different approaches, the Supreme Court
Database, Harvard Law Review and SCOTUSBlog share a
central conviction: publishing open access,46 authoritative data
regarding Supreme Court decision making, assiduously divorced
from biases and presumptions, may facilitate understanding of
the Court’s actual practices by enabling researchers to apply
data to diverse inquiries without devoting extensive time to data
development.47

46. Each of these resources is publicly available via the internet. The
HARVARD LAW REVIEW “statistics issue” is also available in print. See, e.g.,
supra note 16.
47. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 12; Erin Miller, New Supreme Court
Database,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Nov.
12,
2009,
1:24
PM),
www.scotusblog.com/2009/11/new-supreme-court-database (discussing the
Supreme Court Database).
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As the simple examples offered above illustrate, however,
end users must critically examine the structure and substance
of the data reported.48 Some tension among different compilers’
respective taxonomy and coding choices is almost inevitable; and
no source has attempted to devise a comprehensive evaluation
of the degree of accord (or discord) among them. Far more
essentially, even a researcher who fully appreciates the
compilers’ coding decisions and reconciles apparent
inconsistencies may err if she fails to appreciate the limits of the
data reported. Raw data reports, regardless of their format or
rigor, are simply tools. The extent to which they provide
accurate insight is wholly dependent on the questions a
researcher asks the data to answer.
Two fundamental principles build the bridge between raw
data and useful, reliable conclusions. First, data are relevant
only in the context of inquiry-based analysis. Second, data
cannot yield an accurate response to an inquiry if the data do
not coherently and comprehensively capture the information
necessary to test that inquiry.
Failure to apply these principles in the context of Supreme
Court case disposition data (i.e., affirm / reverse rates) leads to
unreliable conclusions regarding the relative degree of harmony
between the Court and the various circuits. The unreliability of
these conclusions arises not from a failure of the data reporting
services but, rather, from the ends to which the data are applied.
Routinely reported case disposition data simply do not capture
the information necessary to draw valid conclusions regarding
harmony between the Court and the circuits. To illuminate this
seeming anomaly, Part B provides a brief overview of inquirybased empirical analysis.
B.

Raw Data in the Context of Inquiry-Based Analysis

Empirical study is self-consciously inquiry based.
Researchers make an observation, develop hypotheses,
formulate research protocols, and apply relevant data to test
hypothesized relationships (qualitative, quantitative, or

48. See supra text accompanying notes 32–40.
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descriptive) among variables.49 Given this process, gathering
data would generally appear to be an exercise that follows the
development of a hypothesis. Today, however, vast amounts of
data exist in the public domain. With regard to Supreme Court
decision making in particular, the Supreme Court Database,
SCOTUSBlog and Harvard Law Review offer a trove of
publically accessible data. They do not, however, contain all of
the data necessary to address every potential inquiry one might
ponder regarding the Supreme Court’s review practices. The
nature of each specific inquiry dictates whether a researcher
may rely upon these resources, must develop new data, or both.
A few recent examples are illustrative.
First, many studies of the Court’s practices rely heavily on
the Supreme Court Database.50 Others studies begin with this
database, then add data or means of applying the data, as
required by their hypotheses. For example, when Professors
Clayton and Pickerill sought to determine whether the “New
Right” had successfully altered the Court’s criminal justice
jurisprudence, they (i) selected all orally argued cases with
opinions from the Supreme Court Database “criminal procedure”
field,51 (ii) analyzed case dispositions and voting patterns from
those cases,52 (iii) developed a method of using the political
parties’ national platforms to identify shifting positions with
respect to criminal justice policy,53 and (iv) compared trends in
the Justices’ decisions to changes in national party platforms.54
49. See generally LAWLESS, supra note 1, at 7-20; Epstein & King, supra
note 3, at 1-2, 19-20.
50. For a typical example, see Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in
the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013) (drawing two data subsets
from the Supreme Court Database to test hypotheses regarding the Court’s
treatment of businesses).
51. Cornell W. Clayton & J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal
Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the Rehnquist Court’s Criminal
Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1411 (2006) (concluding that the
Supreme Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence tracks electoral politics).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1411-12.
54. Id. at 1412-15. See Lee Epstein et al., Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the
United States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
395 (2002) (selecting statutory decisions from the Supreme Court Database,
applying established measures of judicial policy preferences, and gauging
constraints under different models of the legislative process, to determine
whether Justices engage in dynamic agenda setting in the context of the
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Still other studies exploring the relationship between the
Court and the circuit courts of appeal must develop their data
with little, if any, support from publically reported data
regarding Supreme Court practices. For example, Professors
Songer, Segal and Cameron have considered whether circuit
courts act as “agents” that follow Supreme Court policy
preferences rather than their own policy preferences.55 To test
the principal / agent model, they devised a fact-pattern analysis
that measures circuit courts’ congruence with and
responsiveness to the Court.56 They then drew a random sample
of circuit court cases over a thirty-year period in one area of law
(search and seizure), coded variables, and applied the data they
had developed to their hypotheses.57
Each of these studies begins by scrupulously determining
what data are necessary to test its specific inquiry regarding the
Court’s review practices. Whether they are able to produce valid
studies based exclusively on publicly available raw data, or
whether they must develop other or additional data, depends
entirely on the extent to which publically reported data capture
the information necessary to test their hypotheses.
In contrast to these studies, Part III differentiates the data
that are publically available regarding Supreme Court case
disposition from the data that would be necessary to test
hypotheses regarding the Court’s relative degree of accord with
the circuits. Part III then elaborates the methods this Study
applies to determine whether the former can reliably be applied
to the question of Supreme Court / circuit court accord.
III. Raw Data and Inquiry: Reversal Rates, Agreement and
Circuit Splits
A.

Overview of Reversal Rates and the Question of Agreement

A simple definition of “agreement” captures the essence of
the discussion surrounding Supreme Court / circuit court accord.
decision to grant certiorari).
55. Songer, supra note 6, at 673.
56. Id. at 677.
57. Id. at 681.
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Agreement means a “harmony of opinion, action or character.”58
Some scholars attempt to measure harmony directly, by
developing models of ideological accord.59 Others seek objective
manifestations of accord by comparing judicial decisions of the
Court and the circuits.60 One seeking an objective measure of
58. Agreement,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/agreement?show=0&t=1419625780 (last visited Dec.
16, 2015).
59. Among the most well-recognized of such measures are Martin-Quinn
Scores. A summary of Martin-Quinn scores, links to scholarship developing
and applying these scores, and related materials are available at Project
Description, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.berkeley.edu (last visisted
Dec. 16, 2015). See, e.g., Songer, supra note 6 (analyzing circuit court
responsiveness to the Supreme Court).
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Brookings Inst. Press 2006) (referencing
efforts to correlate or understand relationships between judicial performance
and ideology); Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58
DUKE L.J. 1383 (2009) (categorizing circuit court judges into “clusters” that
display similar decision making characteristics, based primarily on Supreme
Court review and reversal); Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judicial
Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163 (2006) (considering whether fear of reversal dampens
circuit judges’ pursuit of ideological preferences); Cass R. Sunstein et al.,
Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation,
90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004) (analyzing appellate judge decision making and
ideology in fourteen areas of law; finding that panel composition affects
decision making).
On efforts to forecast or predict Supreme Court voting behavior, based on
ideology and other models, see generally Josh Blackman et al., Fantasy
SCOTUS Crowdsourcing a Prediction Market for the Supreme Court, 10 NW.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 125, 126 (2012) (analyzing the accuracy of Fantasy
SCOTUS to “test the power of the wisdom of the crowd” by predicting Supreme
Court behavior; comparing results to Supreme Court Forecasting Project
results); Charles M. Cameron & Jee-Kwang Park, How Will They Vote?
Predicting the Future Behavior of Supreme Court Nominees, 1937-2006, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 485 (2009) (developing a measure of Supreme Court
nominees’ ideology to predict voting behavior); Theodore W. Ruger et al., The
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to
Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004)
(discussing a collaborative project that considers legal and political science
models of predicting Supreme Court behavior); Play FantasySCOTUS, THE
HARLAN INST. (2012), http://harlaninstitute.org/sliders/fantasyscotus-org/
(offering a “Supreme Court Fantasy League” that allows participants to “Play
Like the 10th Justice”).
60. “Objective,” here, refers to overtly expressed, and non-controversially
quantifiable variables, such as disposition and reasoning, rather than
subjective matters such as, perhaps, the degree to which the courts are
ideologically aligned. For studies that compare the Court and the circuits
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the comparative degree to which the Supreme Court agrees with
the circuit courts would, first, identify the overt action each court
has taken (i.e., the issuance of a decision) and, then, consider the
degree of apparent harmony (in reasoning and conclusions)
between the Court’s decision and the circuit court’s decision.
Only after this groundwork question has been answered might
one seek to extrapolate more ephemeral, characterological
qualities of ideological and attitudinal harmony by asking why
the Court and circuit agree or disagree.
On a case-by-case basis, determining objective “agreement”
in cases the Supreme Court reviews seems relatively
straightforward, although not entirely without complication. If
the Supreme Court reverses a decision of a circuit court of
appeals, the Court presumably disagrees61 with the circuit in
that particular case on that particular issue.
The larger discussion, however, concerns whether the Court
consistently agrees with particular circuits more often than with
others. In other words, is there is any statistically significant
positive correlation between the circuit that rendered a decision
and the likelihood that the Supreme Court will agree or disagree
with the decision. Assuming one can accurately determine
“agreement” on a case-by-case basis, testing “agreement” in this
larger sense requires a means of amassing and comparing
significant numbers of Supreme Court and circuit court
decisions. To do so, it is reasonable to begin by examining the
Court’s decisions (rather than the circuits’ decisions) because
one will find nothing to compare unless the Court has spoken on
an issue. It might also seem reasonably convenient, then, to
amass a population of cases for comparison by consulting
publically available data regarding the disposition of those
Supreme Court cases. The following discussion elaborates why
those publically reported case disposition data cannot, in fact,
accurately capture the relative degree of agreement between the
Court and the individual circuits with respect to cases the Court
using objective measures, see infra notes 68-73.
61. The Court might have agreed with the circuit court’s substantive
analysis, but reversed for other reasons, such as standing or jurisdiction. The
Court might have disagreed with every aspect of the circuit court’s reasoning,
but reached the same disposition for other reasons. The circuit court might
have agreed with the position the Supreme Court ultimately embraced, but
been bound to follow contrary precedent prior to the Court’s ruling.
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has reviewed.
Each of the data reporting resources noted earlier reports
case disposition data. SCOTUSBlog and Harvard Law Review
publish raw disposition rates by Term, in the aggregate and for
each circuit court of appeals (as well as for the specialized federal
courts and state supreme courts).62 For cases from the circuits,
these reporters derive these data by identifying the merits cases
the Court has decided, determining the circuit to which the
Court granted certiorari (i.e., the “circuit of origin”), determining
whether the Court “affirmed,” “reversed”63 or “vacated” 64 the
circuit of origin in each case, and reporting the total number of
cases affirmed, reversed and vacated, both in the aggregate and
disaggregated by circuit. SCOTUSBlog also generates and
reports simple affirm / reverse / vacate percentages (i.e., cases
affirmed, reversed or vacated divided by cases decided), both in
the aggregate and by circuit.65
The Supreme Court Database reports unconsolidated
individual case disposition data using eleven values66 that
reflect the extent to which the Court agreed with the circuit of
origin in that particular case on that particular issue. Seven of
these values essentially coincide with the three disposition
values SCOTUS Blog and Harvard Law Review report. These
are: (i) affirmed (including modified), (ii) vacated, or vacated and
62. See sources cited supra notes 14, 16.
63. In the HARVARD LAW REVIEW, “reversed” includes cases reversed,
reversed in part and affirmed in part, and reversed in part and vacated in part.
2012 Term, supra note 14, at 418 n.n. On SCOTUSBlog, “reversed” includes
vacated. SCOTUSBlog Statistics, supra note 14.
64. In HARVARD LAW REVIEW, “vacated” includes cases vacated and
vacated in part and affirmed in part. 2012 Term, supra note 14, at 418 n.o.
65. See, e.g., Make-Up of the Merits Docket, supra note 39. These data are
“simple” in the sense that the tools of statistical analysis, which might account
for significance given the numbers of cases presented, have not been applied.
Cf. supra note 14 and accompanying text. In addition to reporting simple
affirm / reverse percentages, both in the aggregate and disaggregated by
circuit, SCOTUSBlog may provide “takeaway” commentary comparing
individual circuits’ reversal rates.
66. These values are: petition or motion granted, affirmed (includes
modified), reversed, reversed and remanded, vacated and remanded, affirmed
and reversed (or vacated) in part, affirmed and reversed (or vacated) in part
and remanded, vacated, petition denied or appeal dismissed, certification to a
lower court, no disposition). Disposition of Case, THE SUP. CT. DATABASE,
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/documentation.php?var=caseDisposition
(last visited Dec. 16, 2015).
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remanded, and (iii) four variables that other reporters generally
code as reversed (reversed, reversed and remanded, affirmed
and reversed (or vacated) in part, affirmed and reversed (or
vacated) in part and remanded).67 The remaining four Supreme
Court Database values relate primarily to cases decided other
than by a full opinion on the merits. Although the Supreme
Court Database does not summarize case disposition data by
circuit or otherwise, it does code the circuit of origin for each
case.68 Consequently, a researcher could readily generate
comparative lists of case disposition data by circuit of origin data
for selected time periods, issues or other variables.
Scholars69 and other commentators70 routinely apply
67. Id.
68. Origin
of
Case,
THE
SUP.
C T.
DATABASE,
http://supremecourtdatabase.org/documentation.php?var=caseOrigin
(last
visited Dec. 16, 2015).
69. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 6, at 263 (considering Supreme
Court circuit of origin only reversal rates); John F. Belcaster, The D.C. Circuit’s
Use of the Chevron Test: Constructing a Positive Theory of Judicial Obedience
and Disobedience, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 745 (1992) (exploring historical
contentiousness between the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court); Roy W. McLeese, III, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship
Between The Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit and its Implications for a
National Court of Appeals, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1048, 1050-51 (1984)
(assessing ideological relationship between the Supreme Court and District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals); Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths
About the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 355, 358 (2006) [hereinafter Wermiel,
Ninth Circuit] (examining Ninth Circuit reversal rates, considering circuit of
origin only data; noting public perception that the Ninth Circuit “is a bastion
of liberalism run amok”); Stephen J. Wermiel, Supreme Court Reversals:
Exploring the Seventh Circuit, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 641 (2008) [hereinafter
Wermiel, Seventh Circuit] (examining reversal rates and reputation,
comparing the Seventh Circuit to the Ninth Circuit, relying on circuit of origin
only reversal rates; noting that “[r]eversals are a hot topic”); see also sources
cited infra notes 71-72.
70. Jeff Bleich, The Reversed Court: The Supreme Court Versus the Ninth
Circuit, 57 OR. ST. B. BULL. 17, 17 (1997) (discussing Ninth Circuit review and
reversal rates, relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates); David A.
DeGroot, 9th Circuit Gets More Than its Fair Share of Scrutiny, DAILY J. (June
23, 2014) (arguing based on raw reversal rates that “the 9th Circuit is out-ofsync with the high court and the other circuits”); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder
in the Court, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2007, at A15 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s
performance based on circuit of origin only reversal rates in the Court’s
October 2006 Term); Roy E. Hofer, Supreme Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 2 LANDSLIDE 8, 8 (2010) (comparing circuit court
success rates based on circuit of origin only reversal data over ten years); Adam
Liptak, Court That Ruled on Pledge Often Runs Afoul of Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
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publicly reported Supreme Court case disposition data to
compare the circuits’ relative levels of agreement with the Court;
ubiquitously conclude that the Court consistently reverses some
circuits with much greater frequency than others;71 and
June 30, 2002 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit’s performance based upon sources
that rely on circuit of origin only reversal rates); Sean SeLegue, Perception Isn’t
Reality: The Ninth Circuit’s Relationship With The U.S. Supreme Court, THE
BAR ASS’N OF S.F., Spring 2011, at 32-34 (relying on circuit of origin only
reversal rates to compare the Ninth Circuit to other circuits); Jonathan H.
Adler, Is the Sixth Circuit the New Ninth (At Least in Habeas Cases)?, THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 1, 2010, 10:44 AM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/01/isthe-sixth-circuit-the-new-ninth-at-least-in-habeas-cases/ (commenting on Dan
Horn, U.S 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on 0-15 Losing Streak, CINCINNATI (Feb.
21,
2011,
11:34
AM),
http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20110219/NEWS010702/102200325?nclick_
check=1 (stating that the Sixth Circuit “keeps getting it wrong”)); Judson
Berger, Take a Hint? Supreme Court Rejects 5 Rulings in a Row From West
Coast Bench, FOXNEWS (Feb. 2, 2011),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/02/02/hint-supreme-court-rejectsrulings-row-west-coast-bench/ (criticizing the Ninth Circuit based upon several
then-recent circuit of origin only cases; suggesting that “[t]he Supreme Court
may be sending a message to one of the country’s most liberal appeals courts”);
Pierre Bergeron, U.S. Supreme Court Reversal Rates Continue to Attract
Attention, SIXTH CIR. APP. BLOG (July 22, 2011),
http://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/supreme-court/us-supreme-courtreversal-rates-continue-to-attract-attention/ (commenting on Williams, infra
note 70, discussing circuit of origin only reversal rates); Mark Walsh, A Sixth
Sense: 6th Circuit Has Surpassed the 9th as the Most Reversed Appeals Court,
A.B.A.
J.
(Dec.
1,
2012,
9:30
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_sixth_sense_6th_circuit_has_s
urpassed_the_9th_as_the_most_reversed_appeal/ (stating that the Sixth
Circuit has “a particularly dismal record before the high court,” based
primarily on circuit of origin only reversal rates for the Terms 2005 through
2011, but also referring to the Hangley Study, see discussion infra Part IV.B);
Carol J. Williams, US Supreme Court Again Rejects Most Decisions by the US
9th Circuit Court of Appeals, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/ 2011/jul/18/local/la-me-ninth- circuit-scorecard20110718 (relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates to criticize the Ninth
Circuit’s success rates during the Court’s 2010 Term); see also sources cited
infra notes 71-72.
71. The Ninth Circuit is a singularly consistent, but by no means
exclusive, target of criticism fueled by raw reversal rate statistics. See sources
cited supra notes 69-70. See, e.g., Hon. Jerome Farris, Judges on Judging: The
Ninth Circuit—Most Maligned Circuit in the Country Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1465, 1471 (1997) (noting perception that “Ninth Circuit is reversed so
often because it is the most liberal circuit in the country and because the
Supreme Court is currently conservative”); Marybeth Herald, Reversed,
Vacated and Split: The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Congress, 77
OR. L. REV. 405 (1998) (considering possible reasons for the Ninth Circuit’s
apparently high circuit of origin only reversal rate); McLeese, supra note 69,
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frequently infer that ideological incompatibility between the
Court and particular circuits drives reversal patterns.72
at 1048, 1050-51 (noting “inordinate rate at which the Supreme Court grants
D.C. Circuit certiorari petitions and reverses or vacates D.C. Circuit opinions”
and arguing that “the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit are ideologically
incompatible”); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, A Decade of Reversal: The Ninth
Circuit’s Record in the Supreme Court Through October Term 2010, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2165 (2012) (relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates;
arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s record “has been strikingly poor”); Horn, supra
note 70 (citing circuit of origin only reversal rates to conclude that the Sixth
Circuit “keeps getting it wrong”); Steven Seidenberg, A Comeback for the
Federal Circuit: This Term, SCOTUS Is No Longer the ‘Court of Correction,’
A.B.A.
J.
(Sept.
1,
2011,
8:00
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/A_comeback_for_the_federal_cir
cuit_this_term_supreme_court_is_no_longer (relying on circuit of origin only
reversal rates to compare the Federal Circuit’s record before the Supreme
Court during the October 2010 Term to prior Terms); Robyn Hagan Cain, By
the Numbers: Supreme Court Reversal and the Ninth Circuit, THE FINDLAW 9TH
CIR.
NEWS
&
INFO.
BLOG
(Sept.
30,
2011,
3:30
PM),
http://blogs.findlaw.com/ninth_circuit/2011/09/by-the-numbers-supremecourt-reversal-and-the-ninth-circuit.html (relying on circuit of origin only
review and reversal rates to criticize the Ninth Circuit); Allen Pusey, Taking
the Fifth to Task, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Blogpost in PRISONTALK: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
IN
THE
NEWS
(July
24,
2004,
10:58
AM),
http://prisontalk.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-70279.html (discussing the
Fifth Circuit’s circuit of origin only reversal record during the Court’s 2003
Term).
72. See sources cited supra notes 69-71. Some commentators have
attempted to articulate other explanations for seeming patterns of high
reversal rates for particular circuits, or criticized the practice of comparing
circuits based upon reversal rates. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Myth of
the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2003) (considering circuit of
origin reversal rates, numbers of cases reviewed, and anecdotal case
examples); Farris, supra note 71 (attempting to rebut criticism of the Ninth
Circuit’s origin only reversal rates); John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and
the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 553 (2010) (examining Supreme Court review and reversal rates
for the Federal Circuit and District of Columbia Circuit); Herald, supra note
71 (examining Ninth Circuit decisions from a single Supreme Court term,
including “indirect affirmances and reversals” in the case of circuit splits, but
not considering circuit splits for other circuits); D.H. Kaye, Reflections on a
Mathematical Argument for Splitting the Ninth Circuit, 48 JURIMETRICS. J. 329
(2008) (considering the “mathematical” argument that the Ninth Circuit’s size
underlies its high reversal rates); McLeese, supra note 69 (examining discord
between the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Circuit based on
rates of review and reversal, relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates);
Richard A. Posner, Is The Ninth Circuit Too Large? A Statistical Study of
Judicial Quality, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 711, 713, 715 (2000) (arguing that the
Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate is not due exclusively to its size); Kevin M.
Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341, 354
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Commentators also combine raw data showing apparent
patterns of differences in reversal rates with raw data showing
apparent patterns of differences in the numbers of petitions
granted to each circuit to draw further inferences regarding the
relative degree of harmony between the Court and the circuits.
Common inferences include that the Court grants
disproportionately greater numbers of certiorari petitions to
specific circuits,73 grants certiorari primarily to reverse lower
court decisions,74 and grants certiorari at least in part to
discipline particularly errant circuits.75
(2006) (relying on circuit of origin only reversal data to examine Ninth Circuit
reversal rates; considering ideology and circuit size); Eric Hansford, Note,
Measuring the Effects of Specialization With Circuit Split Resolutions, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1145 (2011) (examining circuit splits during four Supreme Court terms
to determine whether patterns exist with respect to circuit court success rates
and regional judicial specialization); Cullen Seltzer, In Defense of the 9th
Circuit: Why the Federal Appeals Court from the Left Coast Doesn’t Deserve its
Bad
Rap,
SLATE
(July
16,
2007,
4:09
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/07/in_def
ense_of_the_9th_circuit.html.
73. See, e.g., Bleich, supra note 70, at 17 (“For the fourth term in a row,
the Ninth Circuit will have a disproportionate number of its decisions subject
to discretionary review by the Supreme Court compared to other federal
circuits.”); DeGroot, supra note 70 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s share of
the Court’s docket is high compared to the Ninth Circuit’s share of the United
States population); McLeese, supra note 69, at 1048 (noting apparently high
rate of Supreme Court review of the D.C. Circuit); Fitzpatrick, supra note 70,
at A15 (arguing that “[t]he justices spent much of their time reversing the U.S.
9th Circuit Court of Appeals” during the Court’s October 2006 Term);
Williams, supra note 70 (stating that Ninth Circuit cases “dominated the high
Court’s docket, as usual” during the Court’s October 2010 Term).
74. See, e.g., Hofer, supra note 70, at 8 (noting perception that “the
Supreme Court only takes cases that it intends to reverse”); Kaye, supra note
72, at 331 (“Inasmuch as the Court tends to grant review to cases that it finds
problematic, it is likely to reverse regardless of the circuit in which the case
originated.”); Daniel Solove, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court’s Reversal
Rate,
CONCURRING
OPINIONS
(July
25,
2007),
http://concurringopinions.com/archives/2007/07/some_thoughts_o.html
(concluding from SCOTUSBlog circuit of origin only reversal rates for the 2004
through 2006 Terms that “the Supreme Court primarily takes cases it wants
to reverse, with only a few exceptions”).
75. See, e.g., Hofer, supra note 70, at 8 (noting perception that the Ninth
Circuit is the “rogue circuit”); Posner, supra note 72, at 713, 715 (arguing that
summary reversal “can fairly be described as a rebuke to the lower court”;
attributing the District of Columbia Circuit’s high rate of non-summary
reversals to its “dense menu of cases of national significance” and arguing that
“the Ninth Circuit has no similar excuse for its high reversal rate”); Wermiel,
Ninth Circuit, supra note 69, at 355 (noting that: “In its most persistent form,
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The validity of all of these inferences, beginning with the
basic presumption that a pattern of agreement between the
Court and the circuits exists, hinges on whether simple Supreme
Court case disposition data (i.e., affirm / reverse rates) reliably
capture overtly expressed “agreement” between the Court and
the circuits with respect to cases the Court has reviewed.
Several fundamental hurdles, however, make Supreme Court
case disposition data an unreliable measure of agreement
between the Court and the circuits. Among the most significant
hurdles are that: (i) the Court reviews only a small number of
the total decisions from each circuit (and those chosen for review
depend upon both litigant and Court selection discretion);76 (ii)
for every circuit of origin to which the Court grants certiorari in
any particular case, there may be several other “sleeper
circuits”77 that overtly expressed their opinions on the issue by
contributing to a circuit split (or by issuing a decision in accord
with the circuit of origin);78 (iii) the circuits might send
significantly different types of issues to the Court for review;79
(iv) the circuits’ marked differences in size and workload might
affect the significance of presumed differences among the
circuits;80 (v) changes in the Court’s composition over time might
affect Supreme Court / circuit court agreement; (vi) “affirm”
might mean that only five justices, rather than nine, agree with
the circuit of origin;81 and (vii) the Court (or particular Justices)
might agree with a lower court’s outcome while completely
this perception holds that the Ninth Circuit is so out of control that the
Supreme Court of the United States must devote considerable time and energy
to reining in the judges and correcting their decisions”).
76. See sources cited supra note 6.
77. “Sleeper circuits” refers to the circuits that contributed to a circuit
split, but were not chosen for certiorari. The term calls to mind a bowling ball
toppling the visible pins, only to reveal the “sleepers” standing perfectly,
mockingly, upright behind them. The Hangley Study, discussed infra Part
IV.B, refers to these as “shadow” circuits.
78. See discussion infra Part III.B.
79. See discussion infra at notes 83-92, and accompanying text.
80. Although the implications of circuit size are beyond the scope of this
Article, the application of statistical analysis tools can reveal the significance,
if any, of raw differences in numbers and percentages. Refer to the application
of p scores throughout this Article.
81. The implications of voting splits on the question of accord between the
“Court” (as a presumed monolith) and the circuits are beyond the scope of this
Article because they do not affect the hypotheses.
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disagreeing with its reasoning.82
This Article focuses on how sleeper circuits affect Supreme
Court / circuit court accord assumptions because the sleeper
circuit problem underlies, pervades and complicates each of the
other hurdles that stand in the way of drawing inferences from
simple case disposition data. For example, the data this Article
presents concerning the problems created by circuit splits
incidentally reveal important evidence regarding how issue
disparity may affect Supreme Court / circuit court accord. That
evidence and its implications are noted throughout as well.
Part III.B elaborates the foundational challenges that
circuit splits and sleeper circuits pose in measuring the level of
accord between the Court and the circuits.
B. Circuit Splits, Sleeper Circuits, and the Question of
Agreement
The Supreme Court typically reviews federal circuit court of
appeals’ decisions on certiorari to resolve either a split among
the lower federal courts,83 an important question of federal law,
or a constitutional or quasi-constitutional question.84 When the
circuits have split, some combination of serendipity (such as the
order in which the circuits ruled before a split arose),85
82. See, e.g., infra note 122 and accompanying text.
83. Although the majority of such splits are among the courts of appeal,
the Court does review cases in which the lower federal (district or bankruptcy)
courts have split. See, e.g., Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S.
552, 557 (1990) (resolving split among lower federal courts regarding the
Bankruptcy Code’s characterization of state law restitution obligations).
84. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1254(1), 1331, 1334 (2006 & Supp. 2014); SUP.
CT. R. 10 (identifying considerations in the granting of certiorari). Jurisdiction
over bankruptcy matters is referred from the federal district courts to the
federal bankruptcy courts under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006 & Supp. 2014).
Bankruptcy matters typically begin in the federal bankruptcy courts, proceed
by appeal to the federal district courts (or bankruptcy appellate panels, where
constituted), and by appeal again to the federal courts of appeal.
85. For example, in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the Supreme Court
narrowly affirmed the Third Circuit’s ruling, and thereby abrogated a prior
Second Circuit ruling, on an important interaction between federal labor law
and federal bankruptcy law. NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 534
(1984). The Court previously had denied certiorari to the Second Circuit on
the issue, despite the importance of the question. See Bhd. of Ry. Airline &
S.S. Clerks v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
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circumstance (such as factual nuance),86 the parties’ decision
whether to seek certiorari, and the Court’s own selection
discretion will determine the circuit of origin. Simple case
disposition data (i.e., affirm / reverse rates) reflect, at best, the
extent to which the Court agreed or disagreed with the circuit of
origin on the issue presented. The Court’s ruling, however,
directly reflects the extent to which the Court agrees with both
the circuit of origin and every sleeper circuit that has already
ruled on the issue.
Consider the Supreme Court’s recent bankruptcy law
decision in Ransom v. FIA Card Services.87 The Court granted
certiorari to the Ninth Circuit88 to resolve a circuit split over the
interpretation of a Bankruptcy Code89 provision governing how
to calculate the minimum payments an individual debtor must
make to creditors under a chapter 13 plan.90 The Ninth Circuit
had held that the debtor could deduct a car ownership allowance
from his disposable income for purposes of this calculation only
U.S. 1017 (1975). Instead, the Court waited to grant certiorari until after the
Third Circuit had ruled on the same issue and created a clear circuit split. See
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 459 U.S. 1145 (1983), granting cert. to NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Wermiel, Ninth Circuit,
supra note 69, at 361 (“The Supreme Court could just as easily have used the
rulings of other circuits to reverse at another time, and it may be little more
than a coincidence that a Ninth Circuit case was chosen.”).
86. For example, in NCP Mtkg. Grp., Inc. v. BG Star Prods., the Court
denied certiorari to the Ninth Circuit in a case that involved the standards
under which chapter 11 debtors-in-possession may assume executory
contracts. N.C.P. Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. BG Star Prods., 556 U.S. 1145 (2009). In
an unusual action, Justice Kennedy issued a statement with respect to the
denial of certiorari, which Justice Breyer joined. Id. The two justices noted
that “[t]he division in the courts over the meaning [of the provision] is an
important one to resolve” but “[t]his petition for certiorari . . . is not the most
suitable case for our resolution of the conflict” because the Court might be
required to resolve antecedent questions of state law and trademark
protection. Id. Consequently, Justices Kennedy and Breyer “reluctantly agree
with the Court’s decision to deny certiorari” but note that “[i]n a different case
the Court should consider granting certiorari on this significant question.” Id.
87. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61 (2011).
88. In re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009), cert granted, 562
U.S. 61, 68 (2011) (“We granted a writ of certiorari to resolve a split of authority
over whether a debtor who does not make loan or lease payments on his car
may claim the deduction for vehicle-ownership costs.”).
89. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006 & Supp. 2014) [hereinafter Bankruptcy
Code].
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(2)(A)(i-ii) (2006 & Supp. 2014).
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if the debtor was actually making loan or lease payments.91
Three other circuits (the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits)
disagreed.92
The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit in an eight-to-one
decision.93 The Ninth Circuit was correct (at least in the eyes of
eight justices).94 The three sleeper circuits, which the Court
implicitly abrogated,95 were incorrect (from that same
perspective). This follows because Ransom presented a true
split, in which the circuits disagreed over how to apply a single
legal rule to indistinguishable facts. In such a case, the Court’s
ruling reveals its agreement or disagreement with the sleeper
circuits just as surely as with the circuit of origin. Simple
Supreme Court case disposition data, however, reveals only that
the Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit in this case, not that the
Court disagreed with the Fifth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits.
The sleeper circuit problem arises whenever more than one
circuit has ruled on an issue. Although this most commonly
involves a circuit split, sleeper circuits can exist even in the
absence of a circuit split if more than one circuit has ruled on the
issue before the Court grants certiorari (in such a case, the Court
may have granted certiorari to review a constitutional or other
important question rather than to resolve a circuit split).
A simple analogy demonstrates the inaccuracy of
91. In re Ransom, 577 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2009).
92. See eCast Settlement Corp. v. Washburn (In re Washburn), 579 F.3d
934 (8th Cir. 2009) (permitting the allowance without regard to whether the
debtor was making payments); Tate v. Bolen, 571 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2009)
(permitting the allowance without regard to whether the debtor was making
payments ); Ross-Tousey v. Neary (In re Ross-Tousey), 549 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
2008) (permitting the allowance without regard to whether the debtor was
making payments).
93. Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61 (2011). Justice Scalia
was the lone dissenter. Id. at 80 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Split decisions highlight the crudeness of measuring “agreement”
between the Court and a circuit court without considering the votes of
individual Justices. As noted, the implications of non-unanimous decisions are
beyond the scope of this Article because voting splits do not directly affect this
Article’s hypotheses. See supra note 81.
95. When the underlying facts and holdings clearly allow, the reporting
services may expressly note that the Court’s decision abrogates a sleeper
circuit court of appeals decision. See, e.g., Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich
Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651 (2006); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004); Lamie
v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
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considering only the circuit of origin when measuring Supreme
Court/circuit court agreement. Assume that I purchase nine
items of school clothing for my daughter. I have interpreted the
dress code (the law) to permit each of these items. Moreover,
rather than merely expressing my interpretation over tea at the
local coffee shop, I have overtly acted upon and bound myself to
this opinion by purchasing these items (as a circuit court overtly
expresses its interpretation of the law by issuing a decision in a
case). The school (the Supreme Court) can directly review my
decisions for compliance with the dress code if my daughter
chooses to wear any of these items to school.
Assume that, on the first day of school, my daughter
actually wears three of the nine items to school—in effect, she
has elected to seek direct review of my interpretive decisions.
The school directly reviews my decisions, and decides that two
items are in compliance with the dress code and one is not. My
record before the school (the Supreme Court) is now 67% in
accord on direct review.
Now, suppose that my other six overtly expressed purchase
decisions are a sleeveless t-shirt, a pair of boots, patterned
leggings, skinny jeans, short shorts, and wildly colored socks.
Some other parents (other circuits) agree with me on some or all
of these items (issues) and buy these items for their daughters.
Others do not buy these items either because they interpret the
dress code differently and affirmatively rule against buying
these items (a “circuit split”), or because they have not
considered how the dress code might apply to these items.96
Because my daughter has not yet worn any of these items to
school, the school has not directly ruled on my decisions with
respect to these items. Suppose, however, that other girls choose
to attend school wearing sleeveless t-shirts, patterned leggings
and short shorts (thereby exercising their own selection
96. Parents of middle-school aged daughters will recognize this
hypothetical as far from imaginary.
This may be a less than pristine analogy because the school arguably would be
able to review only the decisions that parents made in favor of an item being
permitted by the dress code, i.e., items actually worn to school. We may
eliminate the imperfection by imagining a process under which a parent who
determined that a particular item does not comply with the dress code may
seek a ruling from the school even if no student has yet worn that item to
school.
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discretion and seeking direct review of their parents’ [circuits’]
interpretive decisions). If the school rules that each of these
items violates the dress code, the school has overtly (although
indirectly) abrogated my interpretive decisions regarding
sleeveless t-shirts, patterned leggings, and short shorts. Is my
record of objectively measurable accord with the school still 67%
(i.e., two out of three on direct review as “circuit of origin”) or is
it 33% (i.e., two out of six, comprising two out of three on direct
review plus zero out of three on indirect review as a “sleeper
circuit”)?
In this illustration, there is no objective way to measure
whether the school and I agree on how the dress code applies to
skinny jeans, boots or wildly colored socks because, although I
have expressed my interpretation, the school has not. With
respect to the other six items, on which both the school and I
have overtly expressed our interpretation, however, one can
readily measure accord by considering both the items my
daughter tested and the items other girls tested. Only the
serendipity of the girls’ selections determined which parents’
identical interpretations of the dress code were subject to direct
rather than indirect review.
Simple Supreme Court case disposition data (affirm /
reverse rates) do not reflect whether the Court agrees or
disagrees with the sleeper circuits.97 Moreover, little weight can
be attributed to the Court’s “choice” of circuit of origin because
both litigant selection and the order in which the circuits have
ruled profoundly limit the Court’s control over the circuit of
origin when resolving a circuit split.98 If the Court functioned as
a roving investigator, seeking out circuit splits, choosing which
circuit’s decision to review, and consistently choosing the circuit
that had erred (in the Court’s view), one might attribute an
error-correcting function to the Court’s grant of certiorari and
consequent designation of the circuit of origin.
Instead,
97. Supreme Court Database, supra note 40 (recording whether the Court
expressly accepted a case to resolve a circuit split, and identifying the circuit
of origin, but not reporting any data regarding the circuits that contributed to
the split).
98. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Even when the circuits
have split, the Court may decline to grant certiorari if the circumstances in
which the proffered case presents the issue are not felicitous. See supra note
78.
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although the Court has some control over whether and when it
reviews a circuit split, it can only choose from among the cases
presented to it. If Circuit P and Circuit Q split on an important
question of federal law, but only the litigants in Circuit P choose
to seek certiorari, Circuit Q has no chance of becoming the circuit
of origin or of being counted as “affirmed” or “reversed.”
Similarly, even if a litigant petitions for review, the Court may
decline to grant certiorari until a circuit split arises. Thus, if
Circuit R decides an issue in 2005 and the Court denies review,
Circuit S decides the same issue in conflict with Circuit R in
2006 but the litigants do not seek Court review, and Circuit T
decides the same issue in 2010, the circuit of origin when the
Court finally reviews the issue may serendipitously be Circuit T.
Litigant discretion also operates at the lower court levels. For
example, if lower courts in Circuit U are split on an issue but
litigants in those cases do not seek circuit court review, Circuit
U has no chance to decide the issue or to become a circuit of
origin in Supreme Court review.
Consequently, in order to use simple affirm / reverse rates
to test hypotheses concerning the relative degree of overtly
expressed accord between the Court and the circuits, a
researcher must assume (or, prove) that affirm / reverse rates
are an accurate stand-in (analogous to a random sample) for how
frequently the Supreme Court overtly agrees with the circuit
courts. In other words, one must demonstrate that there is no
statistically significant difference between the rate at which
each circuit is affirmed or reversed when its decisions come
before the Supreme Court directly as the circuit of origin (i.e.,
the affirm / reverse rate) and the rate at which each circuit is
approved or abrogated when its decisions come before the
Supreme Court overall, directly as a circuit of origin plus
indirectly as sleeper circuit, combined (i.e., the approve /
abrogate rate).99 To do this, one must (i) marshal circuit of origin
affirm / reverse data and circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit
approve / abrogate data, (ii) compare affirm / reverse data to
approve / abrogate data, and (iii) interpret the implications of
99. In the language of statistical analysis, the circuit of origin cases would
need to constitute a random sample of the entire population of cases in which
the circuit ruled on any issue that the Court ultimately addressed by certiorari
either to that circuit or another circuit.
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any differences, including by determining whether they are
statistically significant. Only if affirm / reverse rates mirror
approve / abrogate rates (across time, issues, and perhaps other
variables) can one use affirm / reverse rates to test the
underlying hypothesis, i.e., whether there is a positive
correlation between the circuit that rendered a decision and the
likelihood that the Supreme Court will agree or disagree with
the decision.100
Commentators, however, typically draw inferences about
Supreme Court / circuit court accord (or, more typically, discord)
solely from Supreme Court case disposition data (generally,
simple reversal rates), without acknowledging the challenges
presented by the sleeper circuits.101 Several commentators have
attempted to explain flawed or superficial analyses of reversal
rate patterns by identifying factors that might explain these
apparent patterns, such as circuit size or nature of the issues
presented.102
These critiques are frequently inadequate,
however, because they generally fail to account for the sleeper
circuit problem, typically attempt to explain away apparent
patterns rather than to demonstrate that apparent patterns
might evaporate if sleeper circuits were considered, and tend to
rely upon anecdotal evidence with scant supporting data, at
best.103
100. Null Hypothesis H0: the circuit that rendered a decision has no effect
on whether the Supreme Court will agree or disagree with the decision.
Alternative Hypothesis Ha: the circuit that rendered a decision does affect
whether the Supreme Court will agree or disagree with the decision.
101. See sources cited supra notes 63-67.
102. See sources cited supra notes 69, 98.
103. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 72 (considering circuit of origin
reversal rates, numbers of cases reviewed, and anecdotal case examples);
Farris, supra note 71 (acknowledging the Ninth Circuit’s high reversal rate
based on circuit of origin only data, but arguing that the circuit’s reversal rate
is low as a function of the number of cases the Ninth Circuit decides and is not
surprising given the importance of the issues the circuit decides); Seidenberg,
supra note 71 (relying on circuit of origin only reversal rates to compare the
Federal Circuit’s record before the Supreme Court during the October 2010
Term to prior Terms); SeLegue, supra note 70, at 32-34 (relying on circuit of
origin only reversal rates to compare the Ninth Circuit to other circuits);
Wermiel, Ninth Circuit, supra note 69, at 358 (acknowledging that “anecdotal
evidence is all that this Essay has to offer,” and arguing that “quantitative
questions are only a starting point and must be combined with qualitative
analysis to shed any real light on” the Ninth Circuit’s “liberals run amok”
reputation).
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Recently, a few commentators have attempted to articulate
problems inherent in drawing inferences from Supreme Court
disposition rates without considering the implications of circuit
splits and sleeper circuits. This recognition is an extremely
important first step. In general, however, even these discussions
fail to mount an empirical response to the problem raised by
circuit splits because they tend to rely upon anecdote and
theoretical argument rather than data.104 One recent study,
explored and applied infra in Parts IV and V, does bring data to
the question; however, it reports variations between affirm /
reverse data and approve / abrogate data only in raw
percentages without the tools necessary to determine the
significance of any differences it reveals.
This Article presents the first Study that directly compares
affirm / reverse rates and approve / abrogate rates and
demonstrates the statistical significance of differences between
these data. It does so using two separate datasets that directly
test the basic inquiry: i.e., whether there is any significant
difference between the circuit courts’ affirm / reverse rates (as
circuit of origin) and approve / abrogate rates (as circuit of origin
plus sleeper circuit).105 Part IV describes the datasets and the
methods the Study applies to this inquiry.

104. See Hansford, supra note 72 (considering circuit splits in the context
of specialized judicial decision making); Herald, supra note 71, at 414-17
(including “indirect affirmances and reversals” arising from circuit splits to
bolster the Ninth Circuit’s apparent approval rates for the Court’s 1996 Term);
Stephen L. Wasby, How the Ninth Circuit Fares in the Supreme Court: The
Intercircuit Conflict Cases, 1 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 119 (2005) (considering
circuit splits involving the Ninth Circuit); Wermiel, Ninth Circuit, supra note
69 (acknowledging the unfairness of counting only the circuit of origin but
nevertheless considering only circuit of origin reversal rates); John Summers
et al., Supreme Court Project, HANGLEY ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN & SCHILLER,
http://www.hangley.com/Supreme_Court_Project/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2015)
[hereinafter Hangley Study] (including circuit split data for seven years of
Roberts Court decisions); see also Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy
Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173 (2000) (considering circuits of origin and sleeper
circuits in a different context).
105. Null Hypothesis H0: there is no significant difference between any
circuit court’s reversal rate (as circuit of origin) and its abrogation rate (as
circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit). Alternative Hypothesis Ha: there is a
significant difference between at least some circuit courts’ reversal rates (as
circuit of origin) and abrogation rates (as circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit).
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IV. The Data and The Study
A.

Parameters, Data, Methods and Objectives

This Article does not purport to draw conclusions regarding,
nor to explain the bases for any differences in, the “true” level of
agreement between the Court and the respective courts of
appeal.106 Definitive answers to that question require deeper
analysis of the factors identified in Part III. Rather, this Article
begins the exploration by analyzing the most fundamental
aspect of this relationship that is absent from much popular
discussion, i.e.: (i) whether taking sleeper circuits into account
reveals differences between reversal rates and abrogation rates;
(ii) if so, whether those differences are significant; and (iii) if so,
how those differences affect the validity of assessing accord
between the circuits and the Supreme Court based solely upon
Supreme Court case disposition data. In the course of this
analysis, this Article also highlights important questions that
the data incidentally reveal regarding how issue disparity may
affect presumed rates of accord. Evidence concerning the
potential implications of issue disparity arises specifically in the
context of comparing overall data to single-subject habeas
corpus data and single-subject bankruptcy data.
This Article examines these questions using two distinct
datasets. The first compares affirm / reverse rates and approve
/ abrogate rates for all issues over a seven-year period of the
Roberts Court (as described in Part IV.B). The second compares
affirm / reverse and approve / abrogate rates during the entirety
of the Court’s jurisprudence in one subject area, namely thirtytwo years of Bankruptcy Code decisions (as described in Part
IV.C). Applying two distinctive datasets counter-balances the
benefits and limits of shorter-term overall data and longer-term
single-subject data, and introduces the implications of issue
disparity. The Study examines each dataset independently, and
106. See sources cited supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text
(discerning accord between the Court and the circuits would require, at a
minimum, accounting for the effects of critical variables such as circuit size,
issue disparity, individual Justices’ votes, and changes in composition of the
Court, as well as circuit splits). The question of issue disparity is explored
infra at text accompanying Figures 5, 6, 8, 13 and 14.
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where appropriate, trims data to create comparable parallels.
Where useful, the Study highlights the potential impact of issue
disparity by comparing single-subject bankruptcy data to singlesubject habeas corpus data drawn from these datasets.
B.

Dataset I: All Issues, Roberts Court, Seven Terms
1. Scope of the Data

A recent study reports summary reversal rates and
abrogation rates for the Roberts Court’s 2005 through 2011
Terms (“Hangley Study”).107
The Hangley Study’s most
important contribution lies in the fact that it endeavors to
include the sleeper circuit (therein referred to as “shadow
circuit”) decisions underlying each of the Court’s decisions and
to compare circuit-by-circuit success rates based upon
abrogation data (therein referred to as “full reversal rates”) as
well as reversal data.
2. Methods, Coding and Selection Determinations
The Hangley Study identifies sleeper circuits at a primary
level of depth by counting a sleeper circuit decision only if the
Court’s majority opinion states that it is resolving a circuit
split.108
The Hangley Study reports its comparisons of reversal rates
and abrogation rates using only raw totals and percentages,
without statistical analysis that might determine whether any
perceived differences are significant or the result of random
chance. To analyze these data, the Study this Article reports,
translates the Hangley Study data into a format that makes
determinations of probability and significance feasible. It does
not independently reevaluate the validity of the Hangley Study

107. Hangley Study, supra note 104.
108. Id.; accord Hansford, supra note 72, at 1161-62 (limiting inquiry to
cases in which the Court expressly states that it is resolving a circuit split); cf.
infra note 114 and accompanying text (describing the method used to identify
sleeper circuits in the Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, infra note
116).
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data.109 For example, if the Hangley Study raw data identifies a
category comprising twenty cases, of which nine were reversed
and eleven were affirmed, this Study establishes a data file
(STATA or Excel) showing twenty separate observations and
assigning a value of “affirm” to eleven and “reverse” to nine.
This enables statistical analysis of the data to determine
whether any apparent differences among datasets are
significant or the result of random chance. This Article refers to
these translated data files as the Roberts Court Dataset.110
3. The Habeas Corpus Data
Where useful to highlight potential complications arising
from the disparity of issues the Court has reviewed from
individual circuit courts, this Article considers habeas corpus
data drawn from the Hangley Study. The Hangley Study derives
habeas corpus data on the same basis as overall data, and the
Study this Article reports translates the Hangley Study habeas
corpus data into the Roberts Court Dataset format on the same
basis as other Hangley Study data (Part IV.B.1-2).
C. Dataset II: Single Subject, Bankruptcy Code, Thirty-Two
Terms
1. Scope of the Data
Congress enacted the modern Bankruptcy Code111 in
1978.112 The first cases testing the law came before the Court in
109. Specifically, this Article does not reevaluate whether the Hangley
Study accurately and fully captures every sleeper (or shadow) circuit, or
accurately codes case disposition values (affirm, reverse, etc).
110. The Roberts Court Dataset is available upon request from the author.
Unless otherwise noted, ratios, deviations and measures of statistical
significance and correlation reported throughout this Study have been
calculated to at least the sixth decimal place before being rounded.
111. Bankruptcy Code, supra note 89.
112. The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 and became effective on
October 1, 1979. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong.
(2nd Sess. 1978). It has been amended from time to time, most significantly
by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, H.R.
5174, 98th Cong. (1984); Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and
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the 1981 Term.113 In the ensuing thirty-two Terms, the Supreme
Court has considered seventy-four Bankruptcy Code cases.
Underlying these cases are 248 circuit of origin and sleeper
circuit decisions.114 The Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court
Database 115 compiles data regarding each bankruptcy decision
the Supreme Court has rendered since the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code, and each underlying court of appeals decision,
including both circuit of origin and sleeper circuit decisions.116
Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, H.R. 5316, 99th Cong. (1986);
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5116, 103rd Cong. (2nd Sess. 1994); and
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 256,
109th Cong. (2005). The Bankruptcy Code superseded the former Bankruptcy
Act. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 55th Cong. (2nd Sess. 1898), as amended by
Chandler Act of 1938 H.R. 8046, 75th Cong. (1st Sess. 1937) (repealed 1979)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Act] .
113. See Cent. Tr. Co. v. Official Creditors’ Comm., 454 U.S. 354 (1982);
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
After the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the Court issued opinions in three
cases decided under the former Bankruptcy Act. See Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n
v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979);
United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978). This Article, and the Bankruptcy
Code Supreme Court Database, infra note 116, exclude the Bankruptcy Act
cases.
114. See infra note 116.
Many of the tables and calculations throughout this Article refer to seventysix Supreme Court bankruptcy case observations, rather than seventy-three.
This discrepancy arises from two sources. First, because most aspects of this
Article compare the circuits’ relative performance, these analyses include only
the seventy-three cases that came to the Supreme Court from the circuits. The
seventy-fourth case was certified to the Supreme Court directly from a district
court because it raised important constitutional questions. See N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (affirming the
federal district court holding that grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional). Second, of the seventy-three
remaining cases, three presented two distinct issues on which either the
Supreme Court issued distinctly different holdings, or different sleeper circuits
had rendered underlying decisions. Each of these cases is treated as two
observations, rather than one, which increases the number of distinct
observations from seventy-three to seventy-six. See infra note 121 (identifying
the three cases that merit this treatment). This treatment increases the
number of underlying circuit court decisions from 248 to 251.
115. All datasets and database access are available upon request from the
author. See supra note 110.
116. Bankruptcy case observations specific to this Article are reported in
discrete text files within the Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, as
follows: Appendix I: Supreme Court Bankruptcy Code Decisions, By Term,
1981-2012, lists each Supreme Court bankruptcy case, by Term; Appendix II:
Circuit Court of Appeals Bankruptcy Code Decisions, by Supreme Court
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For simplicity, this Article refers to the aspects of the
Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database relevant to the
question of Supreme Court / circuit court accord as the
Bankruptcy Dataset.
Bankruptcy law provides a useful single-topic comparative
study for several reasons. First, examining a single area of law
reduces the potential for aggregating areas of law that might
foster greater ideological discord together with those that may
not.117 Although there are varied issues even within a single area
of law, focusing on one area of law allows one to compare apples
to apples, at least, if not necessarily HoneycrispTM to
HoneycrispTM.118 Second, bankruptcy law presents a case study
large enough to be meaningful, yet discreet enough to be

Decisions, Alphabetical, 1981-2012, lists each of the seventy-four Supreme
Court bankruptcy cases decided during the 1981-2012 Terms, in alphabetical
order, together with each of the 248 circuit court decisions that found their way
to the Court, either directly as circuit of origin or indirectly as a sleeper circuit
behind a circuit split in those seventy-four cases; Appendix III: Circuit Court
of Appeals Bankruptcy Code Decisions, by Circuit, 1981-2012, organizes the
information contained in Appendix II on a circuit-by-circuit basis.
This Article, and the Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, omit
decisions that incidentally arose from bankruptcy cases but involved no
bankruptcy related issues, namely United States v. Galetti, 541 U.S. 114 (2004)
(considering applicability of statute of limitations in tax matter regarding
partners and partnership), and Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470 (1998)
(clarifying the removal issues raised in Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394 (1981)), and cases in which the Court simply vacated and remanded
or dismissed as moot a Bankruptcy Code decision, namely Christians v. Crystal
Evangelical Free Church, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (vacating and remanding for
reconsideration in light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)), and
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (denying
vacatur and dismissing appeal as moot).
The Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database also compiles additional
variables not relevant to this Study, including each Justice’s individual votes,
party affiliation of each Justice’s appointing president, the specific issues
presented, vote splits, and methods of statutory interpretation applied.
117. Even in areas of the law that are evolving or likely to cause
ideological divide, the Court rarely reverses itself absent the passage of
significant time, social change, change in the composition of the Court, or a
combination of these factors. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896)).
118. The reasons HoneycrispTM varietal apples are so scrumptious are
considered in John Seabrook, Crunch: Building a Better Apple, THE NEW
YORKER
(Nov.
21,
2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/11/21/crunch.
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manageable. The number of bankruptcy cases from each circuit
during this period is also sufficiently balanced to permit
comparison. Third, because bankruptcy cases frequently, but by
no means always, come to the Court due to circuit splits,
bankruptcy law presents a viable opportunity to compare
reversal rates to abrogation rates in a single area of law.119
2. Methods, Coding and Selection Determinations
Three significant data selection and coding decisions
affecting the Bankruptcy Dataset are worth mention. Each of
these decisions is driven by the nature of the inquiry, i.e., the
question of accord between the Court and the circuits.
First, the Bankruptcy Dataset includes a circuit as a sleeper
circuit if any of the following refer to the sleeper circuit’s
underlying decision: the Court’s majority opinion, the Court’s
separate opinions, or the opinions in the circuit of origin case to
which the Court granted certiorari.120 Second, if a case involves
two distinct issues on which the Court treats the underlying
circuits differently, this Study reports the case as two
observations rather than one, for all purposes.121 (If a circuit has
issued more than one decision on the same issue, the circuit’s
position is counted only once.) Finally, the Study codes the
Court’s treatment of the circuit court decision as “agree” or
119. Of the seventy-four Bankruptcy Code cases the Court considered
during the 1981 through 2012 Terms, fifty-two cases (70%) involved circuit
splits. See Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, Appendix II, supra note
116.
120. The Supreme Court does not always expressly state that it is
resolving a circuit split, nor does it always identify the cases involved in the
split. To balance replicability and accuracy, this Article and Bankruptcy Code
Supreme Court Database identify as sleeper circuits both (i) the underlying
circuit court decisions the Supreme Court expressly mentions, and (ii)
additional underlying circuit court decisions that the circuit of origin decisions
mention. Cf. Hangley Study, supra note 104 (limiting inquiry to cases in which
the Court expressly states that it is resolving a circuit split); Hansford, supra
note 72, at 1161-62 (examining circuit splits during four Supreme Court terms
to determine whether patterns exist with respect to circuit court success rates
and regional judicial specialization).
121. The three cases that merit this treatment are Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010), United States v. Reorganized
CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996), and Bd. of Governors v.
MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
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“disagree.” Consequently, if the Court affirms a circuit court’s
result while clearly and expressly rejecting its holding and
reasoning, the case is coded as “disagree” with respect to that
circuit.122
As more fully elaborated in Part V, to the extent that direct
comparisons between overall data and bankruptcy data are
appropriate, this Article specifies whether it compares the
entirety of the Roberts Court Dataset and Bankruptcy Dataset,
or trims those data to create matching parallels. Where trimmed
data is useful, the analysis trims the Roberts Court data to cover
only the twelve circuits in which bankruptcy cases could arise
(i.e., it excludes data from state courts and the Federal Circuit),
and trims the bankruptcy data to cover only the 2005 through
2011 Terms (i.e., the period to which the Roberts Court data
applies).123
V.

A.

Findings: Differences Between Reversal Rates and
Abrogation Rates

Overview of Findings

This Article concludes that: (i) there are measurable
differences between affirm / reverse rates as compared to
approve / abrogate rates on both an aggregate and circuit-bycircuit basis, in both the Roberts Court Dataset and the
Bankruptcy Dataset; (ii) some of the differences are statistically
significant, others are not; and (iii) the observed differences are
122. In order to balance replicability with validity, this exception is
applied only where the difference between “affirm / reverse” and “agree /
disagree” is express and virtually indisputable. The one case that merits this
treatment is United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), in which
the Supreme Court affirmed the outcome reached by the Tenth Circuit but
expressly rejected the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning and holding on both issues
presented. The Tenth Circuit had held that Bankruptcy Code § 522(f)(2) was
intended to apply retroactively, and consequently violated the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Rodrock v. Sec. Indus.
Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981); see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1976 Supp.
V); U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court affirmed the result, reasoning
that § 522(f)(2) was not intended to apply retroactively and did not violate the
United States Constitution. See United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70
(1982).
123. See discussion infra Part V, at Table II and accompanying text.
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significant enough to demonstrate that one cannot employ
simple affirm / reverse rates to draw reliable inferences
regarding Supreme Court agreement with the circuit courts of
appeal, either in the aggregate or on a circuit-by-circuit
comparative basis.
Nevertheless, this Article does not suggest that a researcher
could draw definitive conclusions regarding agreement between
the Court and the individual circuits merely by replacing affirm
/ reverse rates (which do not account for sleeper circuits) with
approve / abrogate rates (which do). One cannot draw reliable
inferences without controlling for other critical variables. These
include, most notably, the effect that issue disparity, circuit size,
and circuit workload may have on apparent levels of accord
between the Court and the respective circuit courts. Although
this Article does not directly analyze these factors, it does reveal
sufficient evidence to suggest the fundamental importance of
issue disparity. This evidence includes marked differences
between abrogation rates for all issues, bankruptcy issues, and
habeas corpus issues, as well as differences in the magnitude of
divergence between affirm / reverse and approve / abrogate
results in the overall dataset as compared to the single-subject
datasets. This evidence is detailed where relevant throughout
the analysis to caution against overly simplistic application of
this Study’s findings and to define the parameters of questions
meriting further study, particularly with respect to issue
disparity.124
Select findings that support these conclusions, within the
specific parameters of the Study, include the following:
(1) On an aggregate (all circuit) basis:
(a) Roberts Court Dataset overall abrogation
rates are significantly lower than overall reversal
rates; in other words, the Court disagrees with the
circuits far less than simple reversal rates would
suggest;125

124. See discussion infra text accompanying Figures 5, 6, 8, 13, 14.
125. See infra Table II and accompanying text.
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(b) Bankruptcy Dataset abrogation rates are
not significantly different than bankruptcy
reversal rates;126 habeas corpus abrogation rates
are not significantly different than habeas corpus
reversal rates; in other words, examining the
Supreme Court / circuit court relationship on an
topic-by-topic basis reveals different patterns of
accord than consolidated-issue analysis suggests;
(c) bankruptcy abrogation rates mirror
overall abrogation rates;127 habeas corpus
abrogation rates are significantly higher than
overall abrogation rates; in other words, the
nature of the issue presented may significantly
affect the degree to which the Court agrees with
the circuit courts.
(2) On a disaggregated by circuit basis, abrogation
rates reveal less variation among the circuits and less
divergence between the Court and individual circuits
than reversal rates alone would suggest. Specifically:
(a) in the Roberts Court Dataset, eleven
circuits’ individual abrogation rates are closer to
the fiftieth percentile than are their respective
reversal rates;128 only three circuits’ abrogation
rates deviate from the mean to a degree that has
strong statistical significance; and only one
deviates to a degree that has mild statistical
significance;129
(b) in the Bankruptcy Dataset, eight circuits’
individual abrogation rates are closer to the
fiftieth percentile than are their respective

126.
127.
128.
129.
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reversal rates;130 none deviate from the mean to a
degree that has strong statistical significance131;
and only one deviates to a degree that has mild
statistical significance.132
Part V.B details aggregate finding and conclusions. Part
V.C details disaggregated by circuit findings and conclusions.
B. Differences Between Reversal Rates and Abrogation Rates:
Aggregate Findings
Part B compares simple circuit of origin only Supreme Court
case disposition rates (affirm / reverse) to overall circuit of origin
plus sleeper circuit rates (approve / abrogate) on an aggregate
(all circuit) basis.
1. Employing Statistical Analysis to Measure Significance:
Roberts Court Dataset, Aggregate Findings
The Hangley Study reports simple percentage reversal and
abrogation rates for all Roberts Court merits cases during the
2005 through 2011 Terms.133 These data reveal an aggregate
reversal rate of approximately 72%, compared to an aggregate
abrogation rate of approximately 57%.134 Figure 1 and Figure 2
illustrate these findings.

130. See infra Table IV and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 130.
132. See supra note 130.
133. See Hangley Study, supra note 104, at Exhibit I.
134. See infra Figures 1, 2; see also Roberts Court Dataset, supra note 110
and accompanying text.
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Figure 1, Data Source: Hangley Study Exhibit 1

Figure 2, Data Source: Hangley Study Exhibit 1
The Study this Article reports creates the Roberts Court
Dataset to convert the Hangley Study affirm / reverse data and
approve / abrogate data from summary format to individual
observations. It then applies statistical analysis tools to
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determine the probability that the observed differences
between these rates are significant, that is, whether these
differences are random or meaningful. That analysis reveals
that the difference between aggregate reversal rates and
aggregate abrogation rates in the Roberts Court Dataset is
highly significant.135 In other words, simple case disposition
data (affirm / reverse rates) do not accurately reflect the degree
to which the Court overtly agrees with the courts of appeal, on
an aggregate basis. Further analysis in the balance of this
Article reinforces this conclusion. For reasons discussed below
in the context of issue disparity, however, the mere fact that
the aggregate reversal rate exceeds the aggregate abrogation
rate cannot support a blanket inference that the Court grants
certiorari primarily to reverse the lower court (i.e., as an errorcorrecting mechanism).136
2. Significance: Bankruptcy Dataset, Aggregate Findings
For bankruptcy cases, the Study examines the entirety of
the Supreme Court’s thirty-two year Bankruptcy Code
jurisprudence through the 2012 Term. Table I compares affirm
/ reverse rates to approve / abrogate rates in bankruptcy cases.
Column 1 reports the aggregate number of bankruptcy cases
in which the Court granted certiorari.137 Column 2 reports the
135. p < 0.0001. Statistical analyses “p” values report the results of
classical tests of hypotheses, two-variable means comparison analyses (i.e., “tTest”), unless otherwise noted. A t-Test result of p<0.01 is reported as “highly”
or “strongly” significant (i.e., 99th or greater confidence interval in the
probability that the result is significant); p<0.05 is reported as “significant”
(i.e., 95th confidence interval); p>0.05 but <0.1 is reported as “mildly”
significant (i.e., 90th confidence interval).
136. See, e.g., discussion supra note 120 and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying Figures 5, 6, 8, 13, 14.
See generally, Kastellec & Lax, supra note 6, at 408 (considering whether the
Supreme Court selects cases for certiorari in order to reverse and correct
errors); Mak, supra note 6, at 54-55 (“[T]he certiorari stage at the Supreme
Court . . . goes beyond simple error correction of the lower courts. Deciding
which cases to decide serves as an opportunity for the justices to pursue their
policy preferences.”); cf. SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is
rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings
or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”).
137. These data derive from Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database,
Appendix I, supra note 116.
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number of those cases in which the Court affirmed / reversed
each circuit, and the simple affirm / reverse rate. Column 3
reports the aggregate number of bankruptcy cases that the
Court reviewed overall as circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit.
Column 4 reports the number of those cases in which the Court
approved / abrogated the circuits’ positions, and the aggregate
approve / abrogate rate.138 To establish a parallel comparison
with overall data from the Roberts Court Dataset, for reasons to
be discussed shortly, Table I also reports a trimmed portion of
the bankruptcy data covering only the 2005 through 2011
Terms.

Table I
Affirm / Reverse versus Approve / Abrogate
All Circuit Aggregate
Supreme Court Bankruptcy Code Cases: 1981-2012 Terms
Roberts Court Bankruptcy Code Cases: 2005 – 2011 Terms
Column 1
Number of
observations
Circuit of
origin only

19812012
Terms

76

20052011
Terms

15

Column 2
Affirm–
Reverse
Number
Percent
Circuit of
origin only
39–37
51.32–48.68
%

Column 3
Number of
observations
Origin &
Sleeper
circuits

8—7
53.3–46.7%

43

251

Column 4
Approve–
Abrogate
Number
Percent
Origin & Sleeper
circuits
108–143
43.03–56.97 %
22–21
51.2–48.8%

138. These data derive from Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database,
Appendix II, supra note 116.
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Source: Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, filename: SCT
Reversals WinLoss Overview *139

During the period studied, there were seventy-six circuit of
origin case observations compared to 251 circuit of origin plus
sleeper circuit case observations. Aggregate reversal and
abrogation rates hovering near 50% are the norm. The
aggregate abrogation rate is approximately 57% in bankruptcy
cases.140 The aggregate reversal rate is approximately 49% in
bankruptcy cases.141 Statistically, these differences are not
significant, given the numbers of cases presented.142 Figure 3
and Figure 4 illustrate these aggregate bankruptcy case
findings.

Supreme	
  Court	
  Affirm	
   /	
  Reverse	
  
Bankruptcy	
   Cases	
  1981	
  -‐ 2012

48.7%

51.3%

Figure 3, Source: Table I

Supreme	
  Court	
  Approve	
  /	
  Abrogate	
  
Bankruptcy	
   Cases	
  1981	
  -‐ 2012

14.

139. See57%
supra notes 116, 127; infra text accompanying Figures
5, 6, 8, 13,
43%
140. See supra Table I, Column 4.
141. See supra Table I, Column 2.
142. See supra Table I (p = 0.2044).
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Figure 4, Source: Table I
The insignificance of the differences between aggregate
reversal rates and abrogation rates in bankruptcy cases sheds
little direct light on the application of reversal data to the
question of Supreme Court / circuit court agreement. Part V.C
considers the extent to which disaggregated by circuit data
provide greater insight.143
3. Implications of Issue Disparity: Aggregate Evidence
Before examining disaggregated data, however, consider
the differences between the Roberts Court Dataset overall
aggregate results, the Bankruptcy Dataset single-topic results,
and habeas corpus single-topic results. The contrast between
overall and single-issue results suggests that issue disparity
may affect apparent rates of accord between the Court and the
circuit courts. Although a thorough analysis of this topic is
beyond the scope of this Study, the evidence this Study does
reveal warrants an important detour. This detour identifies
concerns that require deeper analysis regarding how issue
disparity affects apparent rates of accord, and cautions against
drawing inferences from these data without engaging in that
deeper analysis.
First, according to the data reported in Part V.B.1, the
Roberts Court has reversed the (significant) majority of all
decisions on which it has granted certiorari. In other words, the

143. See infra Part V.C (disaggregating and analyzing reversal and
abrogation rates by circuit).
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grant of certiorari seemingly is more likely than not to result in
the Court reversing the circuit of origin, in all cases decided by
the Roberts Court between 2005 and 2011.144 This might tempt
one to conclude that the Court grants certiorari primarily to
reverse the lower court, i.e., as an error-correcting mechanism.
This assumption is invalid, however, as applied to bankruptcy
cases. The grant of certiorari is slightly more likely than not to
result in the Court affirming the circuit of origin, in bankruptcy
cases.145 Because the difference is not statistically significant,
the relationship between the grant of certiorari and whether the
Court affirms or reverses appears to be profoundly neutral in
bankruptcy cases.146 In contrast, the grant of certiorari in
habeas corpus cases is significantly more likely than not to
result in reversal, as discussed following Figure 5.147
Second, although overall reversal rates are significantly
higher than bankruptcy reversal rates, overall abrogation rates
are virtually identical to bankruptcy abrogation rates. The
Roberts Court Datasets (all issues during a seven-year period)
shows a significantly higher rate148 of reversal (approximately
72%) than of abrogation (approximately 57%).149 In contrast, the
Bankruptcy Dataset (bankruptcy cases during a thirty-two year
period) shows no significant difference150 between the aggregate
reversal rate (approximately 49%) and aggregate abrogation
rate (approximately 57%).151 And yet, the aggregate, overall,

144. See supra Figures 1, 2 (showing reversal rate of 71.6%, abrogation
rate of 56.6%).
145. See infra Table II; supra Figures 3, 4 (showing reversal rate of
48.68%, abrogation rate of 56.97%).
146. See supra Table I (p= 0.2044) (comparing the relationship between
aggregate reversal rates and aggregate abrogation rates in bankruptcy cases,
1981 to 2012).
147. Habeas corpus reversal rates (approximately 87%) are not
significantly different than habeas corpus abrogation rates (approximately
78%), see infra Table II (p=0.1743), but both significantly exceed overall
abrogation rates (approximately 57%).
148. See infra Table II (p < 0.0001).
149. See supra 110 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 116, Figures 3, 4; see infra Table II.
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Roberts Court abrogation rate of 57%,152 is virtually identical to
the aggregate, bankruptcy-only abrogation rate of 57%.153
Third, these patterns remain if one controls for both the
different time periods these datasets cover154 and the different
152. See supra Figure 4 (56.6%).
153. See supra Figure 2 (56.7%).
154. Bankruptcy Code cases do not arise in the Federal Circuit or state
supreme courts. Therefore, the Roberts Court data is trimmed to cases arising
in the eleven numbered circuits and the District of Columbia Circuit, in order
to match the bankruptcy data. The bankruptcy data covers thirty-two Terms
(1981 through 2012), whereas the Roberts Court data covers seven Terms
(2005 through 2011). Therefore the bankruptcy data is trimmed to cases
arising during the 2005 through 2011 Terms, in order to match the Roberts
Court data.
Both overall reversal rates and bankruptcy reversal and abrogation rates have
remained fairly stable during the period 1981 through 2012. The overall
reversal rate the Hangley Study reports for the Roberts Court (71%) is
consistent with overall reversal rates over several decades. Hangley Study,
supra note 104, at Exhibit I. During the period reported by SCOTUSBlog,
supra note 14, for example (namely, the Supreme Court’s 1995 through 2012
Terms), the Court reversed the circuit of origin in 67% of all cases combined.
See
Tom
Goldstein,
Stat
Pak
Archive,
SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.SCOTUSBlog.com/reference/stat-pack/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2015)
(showing a total of 1,299 cases and 875 reversals between 1995 and 2012). This
Study does not independently re-calculate the annual statistics reported by
Mr. Goldstein. Rather, it employs his annual reports to calculate aggregate
sixteen-year simple reversal ratios. Id. When data from HARVARD LAW
REVIEW’S summaries of the 1981 through 1994 Terms are added to this, it
appears that the Court reversed the circuit of origin in 65% of all cases during
the 1981 through 2012 Terms. See The Supreme Court, 1994 Term: The
Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340 (1995); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term:
Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1994); The Supreme Court, 1992 Term:
Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1993); The Supreme Court, 1991 Term:
Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 382 (1992); The Supreme Court, 1990 Term:
Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1989 Term:
Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 363 (1990); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term:
Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 398 (1989); The Supreme Court, 1987 Term:
Leading Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 354 (1988); The Supreme Court, 1986 Term:
Leading Cases, 101 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1987); The Supreme Court, 1985 Term:
Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1986); The Supreme Court, 1984 Term:
Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1985); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term:
Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REV. 311 (1984); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term:
IV. The Statistics, 97 HARV. L. REV. 295 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term:
IV. The Statistics, 96 HARV. L. REV. 304 (1982). Bankruptcy case reversal rates
and abrogation rates have remained similarly consistent over time. During
the period 1981 to 2012, the Court reversed the circuit of origin in bankruptcy
cases at an average rate of 49.3%, and abrogated the underlying circuit court
at an average rate of 56.7%. See supra Table I. During the period 2005 through
2011, the Roberts Court reversed the circuit of origin in bankruptcy cases at a
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courts from which the cases arise. Table II trims the data to
create a closer parallel between the datasets by comparing only
bankruptcy cases in the 2005 through 2011 Terms to all cases
that arose only in the eleven numbered circuits and the District
of Columbia in the 2005 through 2011 Terms (the “trimmed
data”). To further highlight the potential implications of issue
disparity, Table II adds habeas corpus data as well for this same
period.155
Columns 2 and 3 report the number of circuit of origin case
observations and aggregate affirm / reverse rates, for: overall
cases, bankruptcy cases and habeas corpus cases. Columns 4
and 5 report the number of circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit
case observations and aggregate approve / abrogate rates,
during this same period. Column 6 reports the degree of
significance, if any, of the difference between affirm / reverse
rates and approve / abrogate rates, during this same period.
Column 5 reports the degree of significance, if any, of the
difference between (i) bankruptcy abrogation rates and overall
abrogation rates, (ii) habeas corpus abrogation rates and overall
abrogation rates, and (iii) bankruptcy abrogation rates and
habeas corpus abrogation rates.

comparable average rate of 46.7% and abrogated the underlying circuit court
at a comparable average rate of 48.8%. See infra Figure 5.
155. The Hangley Study does not distinguish state and federal habeas
corpus cases. Hangley Study, supra note 104.
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Table II
Affirm / Reverse versus Approve / Abrogate
Overall, Bankruptcy, Habeas Corpus
Roberts Court 2005 - 2011 Terms
Circuits 1-11 and DC*
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6
Issue
Origin
Origin
Origin & Origin & Significanc
Presented
only:
only:
Sleeper:
Sleeper:
e of
Number Affirm/ Number Approve/ Difference
of Cases Abrogate
Between
Reverse
of Cases
Affirm/
Number
Number
Reverse
Rate
Rate
Rate and
Approve/
Abrogate
Rate
All Issues

432

Bankruptcy
Cases

15

126–306

1187

29.4–70.6 %

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/4

8–7
53.5–46.7 %

43

533–654

Significant

44.9–55.1%

p < 0.0001

22–21

Not
significant

51.2–48.8%
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7–46
13.2–86.8 %

86

531

(deviation
from overall
rate is not
significant,
p=0.4182)

p=0.8886

19–67

Not
Significant

22.1–77.9%
(deviation
from overall
rate is
significant,
p<0.00001)

p=0.1743

Source of Roberts Court data: Hangley Study Exhibits I, II
Source of bankruptcy data and all statistical analysis: Table I;
Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, filename: SCT Reversals
WinLoss Overview
*Excludes Federal Circuit, Specialized Federal Courts, and State
Supreme Courts

These trimmed data reveal the same comparative
relationships as the untrimmed data; i.e., Roberts Court Dataset
overall reversal rates (approximately 71%) are significantly
higher than overall abrogation rates (approximately 55%);156
bankruptcy reversal rates (approximately 47%) are not
significantly different than bankruptcy abrogation rates
(approximately 49%); 157 and Roberts Court overall abrogation
rates (approximately 55%) are not significantly different than
bankruptcy abrogation rates (approximately 49%).158
In
156. See supra Table II (p<0.0001). Compare to untrimmed Roberts Court
data, supra note 154.
157. See supra Table II (p=0.8886).
158. See supra Table II (p=0.4182).
The Supreme Court decided fifteen bankruptcy cases between 2005 and 2011.
The Court affirmed the circuit of origin in eight cases, and reversed the circuit
of origin in seven cases, for an aggregate average affirm / reverse rate of 53.3 /
46.7%. See Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, Appendix I, supra note
116; Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, filename: WinLoss Overview,
supra note 139. During this same period, there were a total of forty-three
underlying court of appeals bankruptcy case decisions. The Court agreed with
the lower courts in twenty-two cases, and abrogated the lower courts in twentyone cases, for an aggregate average approve / abrogate rate of 51.2% to 48.8%.
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contrast, although habeas corpus reversal rates (approximately
87%) are not significantly different than habeas corpus
abrogation rates (approximately 78%); 159 habeas corpus
abrogation rates (approximately 78%) are significantly higher
than overall abrogation rates (approximately 55%).160 Figures 5
and 6 illustrate these comparisons.

Figure 5, Source: Table I, Table II
Figure 6 illustrates the comparison between reversal rates
and abrogation rates for all cases, bankruptcy cases, and habeas
corpus cases in the Roberts Court, applying the trimmed data
reported in Table II.

Id. The fifteen bankruptcy circuit of origin cases account for approximately
3.5% of the 432 circuit of origin cases the Court decided from the First through
Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits during this period. Id. Similarly,
the forty-three bankruptcy origin plus sleeper cases account for approximately
3.6% of the 1187 origin and sleeper circuit cases the Court considered from the
First through Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits during this period.
See supra Table II.
159. See supra Table II (p=0.1743).
160. See supra Table II (p<0.00001).
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Figure 6, Source: Table II
As Table II reports and Figures 5 and 6 illustrate, there is
no statistically significant difference between reversal rates and
abrogation rates for bankruptcy cases or habeas corpus cases.161
In contrast, there is a highly significant difference between
reversal rates and abrogation rates in overall cases, combined.162
In other words, the profile of a consolidated-issue comparison of
reversal and abrogation rates looks different than the profile of
a single-topic comparison. Consistent with this observation, the
Court appears to disagree with the lower courts (both through
reversal and abrogation) at a significantly higher rate in a least
one identified area of law (i.e., habeas corpus cases), than in
either another identified area (i.e., bankruptcy cases), or in all
cases combined.163
These comparisons are important, for purposes of this
Article, because they introduce serious questions regarding the
viability of comparing the circuits’ respective performance before
the Supreme Court based on any measure of accord that
161. See supra Table II; infra Figure 8. The difference between Roberts
Court bankruptcy reversal rates and bankruptcy abrogation rates is not
statistically significant. Table II (p=0.8886). The difference between Roberts
Court habeas corpus reversal rates and habeas corpus abrogation rates is not
statistically significant. Table II (p=0.1743).
162. See supra Table II; infra Figure 8. The difference between Roberts
Court overall reversal rates and overall abrogation rates is strongly significant
(p<0.0001).
163. Habeas corpus abrogation rates are significantly higher than all
issue abrogation rates (p<0.0001). See supra Table II.
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aggregates multiple issues. If the circuits routinely encounter,
decide, and ultimately send the Supreme Court different
proportions of cases from areas of law in which the Court
inherently disagrees with all of the circuits at significantly
different rates, issue disparity may help explain differences in
the circuit courts’ apparent rates of discord with the Court.
A simple hypothetical highlights this problem. Suppose that
the Court disagrees with the circuit courts (all circuit courts) in
habeas corpus cases around 80% of the time. Suppose that, in
contrast, the Court disagrees with the circuit courts (all circuit
courts) in some other area of law (e.g., bankruptcy) around 50%
of the time, and perhaps in other areas of the law at rates lower
than 50%. Suppose, finally, that the cases an average circuit
sends the Court for review include about 7% high-disagreement
rate habeas corpus cases. If a particular circuit (perhaps one
with a large prison population? 164) sends the Court a
disproportionate share of high-disagreement habeas corpus
cases (say, 10 or 15%) as compared to low-disagreement cases,
that circuit may appear to have a higher rate of discord with the
Court than a circuit that sends the Court an average or below
average share of high-disagreement cases.

164. The questions raised in this section regarding the potential reasons
the circuits might send the Court different issues for review are beyond the
scope of this Study and merit separate depth of analysis. It is, however,
interesting to note that the two circuits with higher than average rates of
habeas review and higher apparent rates of discord with the Court also house
a disproportionate share of the national incarcerated population. State by state
data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics reveal an average percent of the
national incarcerated population (2,257,267) per circuit of approximately
7.85%, whereas the Ninth Circuit houses approximately 17% of the national
incarcerated population (380,615) and the Sixth Circuit houses approximately
10% of the national incarcerated population (222,264). See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov (last updated Dec. 17, 2015); The Sentencing
Project Interactive Map, THE SENTENCING PROJECT: RESEARCH & ADVOCACY FOR
REFORM, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/map.cfm (last visited Dec. 19,
2015); Sara Mayeux, Mass Incarceration: Breaking Down the Data by State,
PRISON
L.
BLOG
(July
13,
2010),
http://prisonlaw.worlpress.com/2010/07/13/mass-incarceration-breakingdown-the-data-state-by-state/. Similarly, based on preliminary calculations
that warrant more targeted analysis, during the 2005 through 2011 period,
habeas corpus cases made up on average about 7% of the cases reviewed from
each circuit, but 14% of the cases reviewed from the Ninth Circuit and 15% of
the cases reviewed from the Sixth Circuit.
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Exploring the potential implications of issue disparity
would, at a minimum, require rigorous analysis of: whether the
Court disagrees with the circuits (all circuits) at significantly
different rates depending on the types of issues presented
(habeas corpus, for example); if so, what factors might drive
those differences; whether different circuits send the Court
different percentages of high-disagreement and lowdisagreement types of issues for review; whether any such
differences are significant; and, if so, what factors might drive
the disparity in issues that arise in different circuits. This type
of analysis might shed light on the effects of issue disparity, as
well as on the interplay between issue disparity, on the one
hand, and the balance between the Court’s split resolving
function and other bases for granting review, on the other hand.
The importance of these unanswered questions mandates
deeper study of how factors such as issue disparity affect
Supreme Court / circuit court accord. Although rejecting affirm
/ reverse rates as the basis for measuring Supreme Court / circuit
court accord is essential to reduce the types of obvious error this
Study examines, merely adopting approve / abrogate rates
instead, without controlling for issue disparity and other
variables, would remain insufficient to support definitive
conclusions regarding the relative degree of accord between the
Court and the circuits.
Part IV.C disaggregates reversal and abrogation data by
circuit, and provides additional insight into the challenges that
sleeper circuit data and issue disparity raise for using affirm /
reverse rates to measure agreement between the Court and the
circuits.
C. Differences Between Affirm / Reverse Rates and Approve /
Abrogate Rates: Disaggregated by Circuit
Part V.C compares simple circuit of origin only case
disposition rates (affirm / reverse) to overall circuit of origin plus
sleeper circuit rates (approve / abrogate) on a disaggregated
(circuit-by-circuit) basis.
1. Employing Statistical Analysis to Measure Significance:
Roberts Court Dataset, Disaggregated by Circuit
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The Hangley Study reports simple percentage reversal and
abrogation rates for all Roberts Court merits cases during the
2005 through 2011 Terms.165 These data reveal circuit-by-circuit
reversal rates ranging from 47% to 82%, and abrogation rates
ranging from 43% to 68%.166 The Roberts Court Dataset converts
the Hangley Study data from summary format to individual
observations and applies statistical analysis tools to determine
the probability that the observed differences between these rates
are significant.167 The Roberts Court Dataset reveals that (i)
including sleeper circuit data moderates success rates for eleven
of the twelve circuits; and (ii) the differences between reversal
rates and abrogation rates are statistically significant for four of
the twelve circuits, individually.168 Table III reports these
findings. The implications are discussed following Table III.
Column 2 reports the number of cases in which the Court
granted certiorari to each circuit as circuit of origin.169 Column
3 reports the number of those cases in which the Court affirmed
/ reversed each circuit, and the affirm / reverse rate for each
circuit. Column 4 reports the overall number of cases that arose
in each circuit as circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit. Column 5
reports the number of those cases in which the Court approved /
abrogated each circuit’s position, and the overall approve /
abrogate rate for each circuit. Column 6 reports how far each
circuit’s individual abrogation rate deviates from the aggregate
mean abrogation rate and indicates the significance of that
deviation. Column 7 reports the significance, if any, of the
difference between reversal rates and abrogation rates for each
circuit, individually.

165. See Hangley Study, supra note 104, at Exhibit I.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 104.
168. The total number of cases reported in Table III differs from the total
number of cases reported in the Hangley Study because Table III does not
include cases from the state supreme courts or the Federal Circuit. The
balance of the data in Table III is drawn directly from the Hangley Study. See
Hangley Study, supra note 104.
169. See Hangley Study, supra note 104, at Exhibits I & II.
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Table III
Affirm / Reverse versus Approve / Abrogate
Disaggregated by Circuit
Roberts Court 2005-2011 Terms
Column Column
1
2

Column
3

Column
4

Column

Column

Column

5

6

7

Circuit Number Affirm / Number Approve/
of cases Reverse of cases Abrogate
Origin
only

1

15

Abrogate Significance
Rate as
of Difference
Percent of
Between
Number Origin & Number
Aggregate
Reverse
Percent Sleeper Percent
Mean
Rate and
Origin
Origin &
Abrogate
Rate
Abrogate
only
Sleeper
(55.10%)
Rate
Showing
significance
8–7

77

53–47 %
2

41

12–29

119

29–71 %
3

23

9–14

83

39–61 %
4

26

9–17

83

35–65 %
5

32

10–22

102

32–45

106%

42–58 %

p=0.5676

55–64

98%

46–54 %

p=0.7835

47–36

79%

57–43 %

p=0.0382

42–41

90%

51–49 %

p=0.3136

48–54

96%

p=0.4056
p=0.1063
p=0.1395
p=0.1568
p=0.1171
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31–69 %

6

38

7

32

7–31

105

18–82 %
10–22

110

31–69 %
8

22

5–17

82

23–77 %
9

128

28–100

201

22–78 %
10

18

8–10

75

44–56 %
11

37

13–24

94

35–65 %
DC

20

7–13

56

35–65 %
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47–53 %

p=0.6749

35–70

121%

33–67 %

p=0.0220

59–51

84%

54–46 %

p=0.0787

38–44

97%

46–54 %

p=0.8003

64–137

124%

32–68 %

p=0.0005

40–35

85%

53–47 %

p=0.1552

44–50

97%

47–53 %

p=0.7210

29–27

87%

52–48 %

p=0.3123

Total:

126–306

Total:

533-654

432

29.40–
70.60 %

1187

44.90–
55.10 %

p=0.0848
p=0.0257
p=0.0463
p=0.0498
p=0.5033
p=0.2282
p=0.2019
p<0.0001

Source of Raw Data: Hangley Study, Exhibit I
Source of Analysis: Roberts Court Dataset; Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court
Database, filename: SCT Reversals Analysis of Hangley Data
Key: Boldfaced type indicates abrogation rates. Boldfaced italic type indicates
deviations that have at least a mild degree of statistical significance.

Table III and the following analysis evaluate the reliability
of circuit-by-circuit reversal rate data from two perspectives.
First, measuring differences between individual circuits’
reversal rates and abrogation rates demonstrates that reversal
rates do not accurately capture the degree to which each circuit’s
decisions are in accord with the Court’s decisions (Table III
Column 7 and Figure 7). Second, measuring the extent to which
each circuit’s abrogation rate deviates from the mean abrogation
rate provides the basis for determining whether apparently
higher or lower rates of accord are significant, and establishes
an accurate starting point for analyzing factors that might affect
differences in accord between the Court and the individual
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circuits (such as, perhaps, issue disparity) (Table III Column 6
and Figure 8).
First, the data reported in Table III reveal how the inclusion
of the sleeper circuits affects apparent success rates for each
circuit. These disaggregated data heighten the previously
identified concerns (in the context of aggregate data) with using
simple reversal data to draw inferences about circuit courts’
discord with the Court.170 Table III reveals that adding sleeper
circuit data to circuit of origin data moderates the circuits’
individual success rates (compare Column 3 and Column 5). Not
only is the mean abrogation rate (approximately 55%)
significantly closer to the fiftieth percentile than the mean
reversal rate (approximately 71%),171 but each circuit’s
individual result also moderates (that is, moves closer to the
fiftieth percentile) when sleeper circuit data are included (other
than the First Circuit).172 Moreover, for every one of these
circuits (again, excluding the First Circuit), the moderation is in
a positive direction of accordance. In other words, when sleeper
circuit data are included (i.e., using “approve” as the measure of
accord), every circuit (other than the First Circuit) shows a rate
of accord with the Court that is higher than its apparent rate of
accord using only circuit of origin data (i.e., using “affirm” as the
measure of accord).
Simple affirm / reverse data (Column 3) show only one
circuit with an accord rate within five points of the fiftieth
percentile,173 and only one additional circuit within ten points.174
Three circuits have simple affirm / reverse rates more than
twenty-five points beyond the fiftieth percentile.175 Overall
approve/abrogate data (Column 5), in comparison, show four

170. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 136, 143-46 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Table III (bottom row).
172. See supra Table III, Columns 3, 5. It is difficult to draw meaningful
conclusions regarding the First Circuit because its circuit of origin record is
affected by a small dataset; reversal and abrogation rates are both close to 50%;
and the difference between reversal rate and abrogation rate is not statistically
significant (p=0.4056).
173. This is the First Circuit. See supra Table III, Column 3.
174. This is the Tenth Circuit. See supra Table III, Column 3.
175. These are the Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. See supra Table III,
Column 3.
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circuits within five points of the fiftieth percentile, 176 two
additional circuits within ten points,177 and every circuit within
twenty-five points of the fiftieth percentile.178
Similarly, the inclusion of sleeper circuit data moderates the
presumed extremes of discord. The highest individual circuit
reversal rate is 82%; the highest individual circuit abrogate rate
is 68% (Column 5). In comparison, six circuits show simple
reversal rates in excess of 68% (Column 3).179 Figure 7 illustrates
the divergence between reversal rates and abrogation rates, by
circuit, in the Roberts Court.

Figure 7, Source: Table III
Table III, Column 7, reports the statistical significance of
the divergences illustrated by Figure 7. Not only is the
divergence between aggregate reversal and abrogation rates
highly significant, the divergence between reversal rates and
abrogation rates is statistically significant (at least mildly) for
176. These are the Second, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits. See supra
Table III, Column 5.
177. These are the First and Fourth Circuits. See supra Table III, Column
5.
178. See supra Table III, Column 5.
179. These are the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth
Circuits. See supra Table III, Column 3.
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four of the circuits, individually (namely, the Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits).180 In other words, using simple
reversal rates to measure the degree to which the Court
“disagrees” with these circuits, individually, would be
significantly erroneous. These differences, alone, demonstrate
the unreliability of using reversal rates to compare circuit courts’
relative success rates before the Supreme Court.
The Roberts Court Dataset reveals additional errors in
analysis and conclusions that would arise from employing
reversal rates rather than abrogation rates to measure
individual circuits’ accord with the Court. For six circuits, the
presumed “result” in terms of accord with the Supreme Court
would be simply wrong. One circuit that would be recorded as
“majority affirmed” using circuit of origin only data, is instead
recorded as “majority abrogated” using circuit of origin plus
sleeper circuit data.181 Five circuits would be recorded as
“majority reversed” using circuit of origin only data, but as
“majority approved” using circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit
data.182 The degree of accord would also be misstated for every
circuit. Eleven of the twelve circuits’ success rates moderate
(that is, move closer to the fiftieth percentile) when sleeper
circuit data is added.183
Second, Table III, Column 6, compares the circuits’ relative
discord with the Supreme Court based upon the extent to which
each circuit’s individual abrogation rate deviates from the
aggregate mean abrogation rate for all Roberts Court cases
(approximately 55%).184 Figure 8 illustrates these deviations.

180. See supra Table III, Column 7. The significance of the difference is
strong for the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits, and mild for the Sixth
Circuit.
181. This is the First Circuit. See supra Table III, Columns 3, 5.
182. These are the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of
Columbia Circuits. See supra Table III, Columns 3, 5.
183. The only exception is the First Circuit. See supra note 173.
184. The aggregate mean abrogation rate in Roberts Court cases over
seven years is 55.1%, excluding cases from the Federal Circuit and state
supreme courts. See supra Table III, Column 6.
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Figure 8, Source: Table III
Table III and Figures 7 and 8 reveal that four circuits’
abrogation rates deviate from the mean to some degree of
significance. Particularly, the Court agrees more than average
with the Third Circuit to a significant degree,185 and Seventh
Circuit to a mildly significant degree.186 The Court disagrees
more than average with the Sixth Circuit to a significant
degree,187 and the Ninth Circuit to a more significant degree.188
The other eight circuits’ abrogation rates deviate from the
aggregate mean to a degree that has no greater significance than
random chance. In other words, the degree to which the Court
agrees with these circuits is not significantly different than the
degree to which the Court agrees with the other circuits.
For purposes of this Article, these comparisons reveal that
simple reversal rates do not reliably reflect the comparative
degree to which the Court agrees with the circuit courts of
appeal. As previously discussed, however, attributing
differences in the degree to which the Court agrees with the
circuits to ideological compatibility or other factors would be
purely speculative absent a rigorous study of the implications of
issue disparity, as well as other variables.189 For example, there
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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is no obvious blue-state liberal / red-state conservative
ideological divide separating the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,
which show less accord with the Court (comprising Kentucky
(red), Michigan (blue), Ohio (purple), Tennessee (red), California
(blue), Alaska (red), Hawaii (blue), Oregon (blue), Washington
(blue), Montana (red), Idaho (red), Nevada (purple), Arizona
(red) and Guam) from the Seventh and Third Circuits, which
show greater accord with the Court (comprising Illinois (blue),
Indiana (pink), and Wisconsin (blue), Delaware (blue), New
Jersey (blue) and Pennsylvania (blue)).190 Further empirical
study is necessary to explore whether any patterns of issue
disparity, circuit size, or other variables distinguish these
circuits.191 This Article does not speculate on matters of ideology
or issue disparity, but rather, cautions against drawing
unsupported ideological or other inferences from differences in
either reversal or abrogation rates without rigorous study of and
control for factors that might contribute to those differences.
2. Significance: Bankruptcy Dataset, Disaggregated by
Circuit
The Bankruptcy Dataset examines Supreme Court accord on
a circuit-by-circuit basis, for all bankruptcy cases during the
1981 through 2012 Supreme Court Terms (Table IV), comparing
circuit of origin only data (affirm / reverse rates) to circuit of
origin plus sleeper circuit data (approve / abrogate rates).
Including sleeper circuit data in the analysis of bankruptcy
cases moderates success rates for most circuits individually and
reveals differences in circuit-by-circuit success rates that are
significant enough to warrant rejecting the use of simple
reversal rates as a basis for comparing the circuits’ relative
performance before the Court.192
infra Figures 13, 14, and accompanying text.
190. See Paul Starr, Red State, Blue State: Polarization and the American
Situation,
THE
AMERICAN
PROSPECT
(Nov.
3,
2014),
http://prospect.org/article/red-state-blue-state-polarization-and-americansituation (reporting results of four presidential elections, 2000 through 2012).
191. For example, might the Sixth and Ninth Circuit have
disproportionately high prison populations and send the Court for review
disproportionately high numbers of habeas corpus cases? See supra note 164.
192. See infra Table IV, notes 190-211 and accompanying text.
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Column 2 reports the number of bankruptcy cases in which
the Court granted certiorari to each circuit as circuit of origin.
Column 3 reports the number of those cases in which the Court
affirmed / reversed each circuit, and the simple affirm / reverse
rate for each circuit. For example, the Court granted certiorari
to the Third Circuit in seven cases, and affirmed the Third
Circuit in six of those cases, for an 86% simple affirm rate.193
Column 4 reports the overall number of bankruptcy cases
that arose in each circuit as circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit
combined. Column 5 reports the number of those cases in which
the Court approved / abrogated each circuit’s position, and the
overall approve / abrogate rate for each circuit. For example,
although the Court granted certiorari to the Third Circuit in
only seven cases, the Court granted certiorari to some other
circuit to resolve a circuit split in seventeen additional cases in
which a Third Circuit decision had contributed to the split.194
Thus, the Court reviewed, directly or indirectly, twenty-four
Third Circuit decisions. If one considers only the seven cases in
which the Court granted certiorari to the Third Circuit, the
Third Circuit’s 86% affirm rate is impressive. If, however, one
includes the Third Circuit’s sleeper decisions, the circuit’s
overall approval rate of 46% hews very close to the fiftieth
percentile, and flips from 86% majority agree between the Third
Circuit and the Supreme Court to 54% majority disagree.195
Column 6 reports how far each circuit’s individual
abrogation rate deviates from the aggregate mean abrogation
rate of approximately 57%. For example, the Third Circuit’s
abrogation rate of 54% is 95% of the mean, which is not a
statistically significant difference.196
193. See infra Table IV, Column 3; Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court
Database, Appendix III, supra note 116 (setting forth, by circuit, each circuit
of origin and sleeper circuit decision in this Study, and identifying each
circuit’s circuit of origin decisions).
194. See supra Table III, Column 3; Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court
Database, Appendix II, supra note 116 (setting forth, by Supreme Court
decision, each circuit of origin and sleeper circuit decision, and identifying the
circuit of origin decision underlying each Supreme Court decision); Bankruptcy
Code Supreme Court Database, Appendix III, supra note 116 (setting forth, by
circuit, each circuit of origin and sleeper circuit decision in this Study, and
identifying each circuit’s circuit of origin decisions).
195. See infra Table IV, Columns 4, 5.
196. See infra Table IV, Column 6.
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Table IV
Affirm / Reverse versus Approve / Abrogate
Disaggregated by Circuit
Bankruptcy Cases 1981-2012 Terms
Column
1

Column
2

Column
3

Column
4

Column 5

Column 6

Circuit

Number

Affirm/
Reverse

Number
of cases

Approve/
Abrogate

Number

Origin &
Sleeper

Number

Abrogate
Rate as
Percent of
Aggregate
Mean
Abrogate
Rate
(56.97%)

of Cases
Origin
only

Percent
Origin
only

1

4

3–1

9

75–25 %
2

6

2–4

7

4

5

5

6

6–1

19
24

8

5–3

7

3–4

25

9

4–5

95%

12–12

88%

10–13

99%

12–13

91%

48–52 %
19

4–15

139%

21–79 %

43 - 57
%
8

11–13

43–57 %

63–37 %
7

83%

50–50 %
23

50–50 %
6

10–9

46–54 %
24

40–60 %
3–3

59%

53–47 %

86–14 %
2–3

6–3
67–33 %

33–67 %
3

Percent
Origin &
Sleeper

26

11–15

102%
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44–56 %
9

9

10

9

5–4

42–58 %
34

56–44 %
5–4

5

0–5

1

1–0

22

11–12

92%

7–15

120%

32–68 %
3

100–0 %
Total: 76

114%

48–52 %

0–100 %
DC

12–22
35–65 %

23

56–44 %
11
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2–1

59%

67–33 %

39–37

Total:

108–143

51.32–
48.68 %

251

43.03–56.97%

Source: Bankruptcy Code Supreme Court Database, filename: SCT
Reversals WinLoss Overview
Key: Boldfaced type indicates abrogation rates.

As with the Roberts Court Dataset, this analysis evaluates
the reliability of reversal rate data from two perspectives,
elaborated below. First, measuring differences between
individual circuits’ reversal rates and abrogation rates
demonstrates that simple reversal rates do not accurately
capture the degree to which each circuit’s decisions are in accord
with the Court’s decisions (Table IV Col. 3, 5 and Figure 9).
Second, measuring the extent to which each circuit’s abrogation
rate deviates from the mean abrogation rate provides the basis
for determining whether apparently higher or lower rates of
accord are significant, and establishes an accurate starting point
for analyzing factors that might affect differences in accord
between the Court and the individual circuits. (Table IV Col. 6
and Figure 10).
First, these data reveal how the inclusion of the sleeper
circuits affects apparent success rates for each circuit. As with
the Roberts Court overall data,197 these effects reinforce the
unreliability of using simple reversal data to draw inferences
about circuit courts’ accord with the Court.198 Table IV reveals
that adding sleeper circuit data to circuit of origin data generally
197. See supra Table III and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., discussion supra notes 136, 143-46 and accompanying text.
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moderates the circuits’ individual success rates in bankruptcy
cases.199 Although the aggregate mean abrogation rate is not
significantly different than the aggregate mean reversal rate in
bankruptcy cases,200 all but four circuits’201 results moderate
(that is, move closer to the fiftieth percentile) when sleeper
circuit data are included. Simple affirm / reverse data show only
one circuit with a rate of accord within five points of the fiftieth
percentile,202 and five circuits within ten points.203 Overall
approve / abrogate data, in contrast, show five circuits within
five points of the fiftieth percentile,204 and seven circuits within
ten points.205
Similarly, the inclusion of sleeper circuit data moderates the
presumed extremes reflected in affirm / reverse data. The
highest individual circuit affirm rate in bankruptcy cases is
100%; the highest individual circuit approve rate is 67%. The
highest individual circuit reverse rate is 100%; the highest
individual circuit abrogate rate is 79%.206
199. Compare supra Table IV, Column 3, with Table IV, Column 5.
200. Table IV reports an aggregate circuit of origin rate of approximately
51% affirm, compared to origin plus sleeper circuit rate of approximately 43%
approve, and an aggregate circuit of origin rate of approximately 49% reverse,
compared to an aggregate origin plus sleeper circuit rate of approximately 57%
abrogate. See supra Table IV. The difference between the affirm / reverse rate
and approve / abrogate rate is not statistically significant; p = 0.2044.
201. These are the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See supra
Table IV, Columns 3, 5.
202. This is the Fifth Circuit. See supra Table IV, Column 3.
203. These are the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. See
supra Table IV, Column 3.
204. These are the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits. See
supra Table IV, Column 5.
205. These are the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits. See supra Table IV, Column 5.
206. The Court reversed all five bankruptcy cases originating in the
Eleventh Circuit, as circuit of origin. The Court reviewed twenty-two Eleventh
Circuit decisions overall, as origin plus sleeper circuit, which is a sufficiently
robust number for purposes of comparison to the other circuits. See supra Table
IV, Columns 2, 4.
The District of Columbia Circuit, in contrast, sent the Court only one
bankruptcy case, as circuit of origin, and only three cases as circuit of origin
plus sleeper circuit over thirty-two years. See supra Table IV, Columns 2, 4.
Given the particular jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Circuit, it is
predictably uncommon for bankruptcy cases to arise in that circuit. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1331 (2006 & Supp. 2013) (granting D.C. Circuit jurisdiction
over appeals from the District Court for the District of Columbia sitting as the
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Figure 11 illustrates the divergence between reversal rates
and abrogation rates, by circuit, in bankruptcy cases.

Figure 11, Source: Table IV
These differences between reversal rates and abrogation
rates (in the context of bankruptcy cases over a thirty-two year
period) again demonstrate that reversal rates do not accurately
reflect circuit courts’ comparative accord with the Supreme
Court. The small datasets make a demonstration of statistical
significance
difficult
on
a
circuit-by-circuit
basis.207
Nevertheless, one circuit (the Third Circuit) does demonstrate a
mildly significant statistical difference between reversal rates
and abrogation rates.208

highest court of a “state” or hearing a federal question).
207. As reported in Table IV, no circuit has more than thirty observations
as circuit of origin, and only one circuit (the Ninth Circuit) has more than thirty
observations as origin plus sleeper circuit. See supra Table IV, Columns 2, 4.
208. See supra Table IV (p=0.0654). The other circuits are as follows: First
Circuit p=0.7867, Second Circuit p=0.4307, Fourth Circuit p=0.6967, Fifth
Circuit p=0.7843, Sixth Circuit p=0.4906, Seventh Circuit p=0.2846, Eighth
Circuit p=0.9143, Ninth Circuit p=0.2798, Tenth Circuit p=0.7054, Eleventh
Circuit p=0.1541, and District of Columbia p=1.0. See supra Table IV.
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The bankruptcy data demonstrate additional errors that
would arise from employing reversal rates rather than
abrogation rates to measure individual circuits’ accord with the
Court. For six circuits, the presumed “result” in terms of accord
with the Supreme Court would be simply wrong. Four circuits
that would be recorded as “majority affirmed” using circuit of
origin only data, are instead recorded as “majority abrogated”
using overall circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit data.209 One
circuit would be recorded as “majority reversed” using circuit of
origin only data, but as “majority approved” using circuit of
origin plus sleeper circuit data.210 One circuit moves from
apparent neutrality using circuit of origin only data to apparent
discord using circuit of origin plus sleeper circuit data.211 The
degree of accord would also be misstated for every circuit. Eight
circuits’ success rates moderate (that is, move closer to the
fiftieth percentile) when sleeper circuit data is added; four move
farther from the fiftieth percentile.212
Second, the data in Table IV compare the circuits’ discord
with the Supreme Court based on each circuit’s deviation from
the mean rate of discord (Column 6). Figure 12 illustrates the
degree to which each circuit’s individual abrogation rate
deviates from the mean abrogation rate for all bankruptcy
cases.213

209. These are the Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See supra
Table III, Columns 3, 5.
210. This is the Second Circuit. See supra Table III, Columns 3,5.
211. This is the Fifth Circuit. See supra Table III, Columns 3,5 (reporting
50% affirm / reverse versus 43% - 57% approve / abrogate).
212. Moving closer to the fiftieth percentile are the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits. Moving
farther from the fiftieth percentile are the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits. See supra Table III, Columns 3, 5.
213. The aggregate mean abrogation rate in bankruptcy cases over thirtytwo years is 57%. See supra Table I and Figure 2.
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Figure 12, Source: Table IV
In general, these data reveal that bankruptcy abrogation
rates are relatively stable across circuits and do not vary
significantly from reversal rates. Nine circuits’ abrogation rates
are within twenty percentage points of the mean (six below
mean, three above mean);214 five are within ten points (four
below mean, one above mean).215 For example, the differences
between the mean abrogation rate and the Ninth Circuit’s
abrogation rate, which is 14% above the mean, or the Eleventh
Circuit’s abrogation rate, which is 20% above the mean, have no
greater statistical significance than random chance. The
outlying result for the District of Columbia Circuit is not
statistically significant because of the small number of cases
from this circuit. A different result in one or two cases could
dramatically affect the results. Similarly, First Circuit’s
deviation from the mean is not statistically significant.216 The
only other noteworthy outlier is the Seventh Circuit, with an
abrogation rate 39% above the aggregate mean, which translates
to mild statistical significance.217 In other words, the Court
disagreed with the Seventh Circuit somewhat significantly more
than average in the bankruptcy cases. None of the other circuits’
deviations from the mean abrogation rate is significant.218
Again, it would be speculative to infer reasons for these
differences without controlling for issue disparity and other
variables. Rather, for purposes of this Study, although the
214. These are the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. See supra Figure 12.
215. These are the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. See
supra Figure 12.
216. See supra Table III (p=0.1939).
217. See supra Table III (p=0.0345).
218. Results for the remaining circuits are as follows: Second Circuit
p=0.4253, Third Circuit p=0.7897, Fourth Circuit p=0.5104, Fifth Circuit
p=0.9666, Sixth Circuit p=0.6304, Eighth Circuit p=0.9423, Ninth Circuit p=
0.3592, Tenth Circuit p=0.6569, Eleventh Circuit p=0.2825, and District of
Columbia Circuit p=0.5518.
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deviations are mild, they reinforce the conclusion that reverse /
affirm data do not accurately reflect Supreme Court / circuit
court accord.
3. Implications of Issue Disparity: Disaggregated by Circuit
These findings again merit a brief detour regarding the
potential implications of issue disparity. If the Court
consistently disagrees with particular circuit courts more than
others, one would expect to find similar patterns of discord
without regard to time periods examined, or issues presented.
To test whether such patterns of accord exist within the specific
parameters of this Study, Figures 13 and 14 compare circuit-bycircuit bankruptcy abrogation rates to Roberts Court overall
abrogation rates. Figure 13 illustrates abrogation rates as a
percentage of mean abrogation rates. Figure 14 illustrates these
same data in the format of deviation from mean abrogation rate.

Figure 13, Source: Table III, Table IV
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Figure 14, Source: Table III, Table IV
In the Roberts Court Dataset (all issues), eight circuits’
abrogation rates are within twenty percentage points of the
mean (seven below mean, one above mean),219 six are within ten
points (five below mean, one above mean).220 In the Bankruptcy
Dataset, nine circuits’ abrogation rates are within twenty points
of the mean (six below mean, three above mean);221 and five are
within ten points of the mean (four below mean, one above
mean).222
Several aspects of this comparison are notable. First, if the
Court consistently disagrees with particular circuits more than
others, one would expect circuit-by-circuit abrogation rates to
219. Below and within twenty points of the mean are the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits; above and within ten
points of the mean is the First Circuit. See supra Figure 14.
220. Below and within ten points of the mean are the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits; above and within ten points of the mean
is the First Circuit. See supra Figure 14.
221. See supra Figure 14.
222. See supra Figure 14.
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move in lockstep, without regard to issue disparity. In other
words, the errant circuits would experience extraordinary
abrogation rates without regard to whether one examines cases
arising in a single area of law, or all cases in the aggregate.
Figure 13 and Figure 14 reveal, instead, incoherently scattered
relationships between each circuit’s individual abrogation rate
in bankruptcy cases and overall cases. In other words, there is
no statistically significant relationship between deviation from
the mean abrogation rate in Roberts Court cases and deviation
from the mean abrogation rate in bankruptcy cases.223
Second, three circuits’ Roberts Court overall abrogation
rates deviate from the mean by more than twenty points. The
Third Circuit is twenty-one points below the mean, the Sixth
Circuit is twenty-one points above the mean, and the Ninth
Circuit is twenty-four points above the mean.224 Given the
numbers of cases from each of these circuits, these deviations
are statistically significant for each of these three circuits.225 For
the Ninth Circuit, the deviation is strongly significant.226 The
Seventh Circuit’s abrogation rate deviates from the mean by
sixteen points (below mean), which is mildly significant for that
circuit.227 None of the other circuits’ individual deviations from
the mean are statistically significant.228
These findings are quite different than the findings in
bankruptcy cases, in which no circuit’s deviation from the mean
is strongly significant.229 The only circuit that diverges
somewhat significantly from the mean in both datasets is the
Seventh Circuit.230 The Seventh Circuit’s deviation is mild in
each dataset, however, and is essentially self-canceling because
223. See supra Table IV (p=0.965348, Correlation = -0.01408).
224. See supra Table IV and Figure 14.
225. At least a mild significance is shown for each, as follows: Third
Circuit p=0.0382, Sixth Circuit p=0.0220, and a strong significance of p=0.0005
for the Ninth Circuit. See supra Table III, Column 6.
226. See supra Table IV (p=0.0005).
227. See supra Table IV (p=0.0787).
228. The results for the remaining circuits are as follows: First Circuit
p=0.5676, Second Circuit p=0.7835, Fourth Circuit p=0.3136, Fifth Circuit
p=0.6749, Eighth Circuit p=0.8003, Tenth Circuit p=0.1552, Eleventh Circuit
p=0.7210, and District of Columbia Circuit p=0.3123. See supra Table III,
Column 6.
229. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
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it is slightly above the mean in bankruptcy cases and slightly
below the mean in Roberts Court overall cases.231
The fact that the aggregated-issue Roberts Court Dataset
produces more circuits that deviate significantly from the mean
than the issue-specific Bankruptcy Dataset again highlights the
need for further study regarding the potential implications of
issue disparity on Supreme Court / circuit court accord. Why
might circuits that do not display significant deviations in an
issue-specific bankruptcy case study nevertheless display
abrogation rates significantly above (Sixth and Ninth) or below
(Third) the mean when all issues are aggregated? The
preliminary evidence suggests that the mix of issues the circuits
encounter and send to the Court for review may skew their
apparent overall success rates before the Court.
VI.

Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

In today’s data-driven world, dedicated researchers make
available to other researchers and to the public extensive raw
data regarding the functioning of our legal institutions. As this
Article empirically demonstrates, however, even the most
authoritative data can lead to invalid results if those data do not
capture the information essential to test a carefully constructed
hypothesis.
Supreme Court reversal rates do not embody sufficiently
robust data to support valid conclusions regarding accord
between the Court and the circuit courts of appeal, let alone to
support inferences regarding the circuit courts’ relative
ideological compatibility with the Supreme Court.
Where more than one circuit has ruled on an issue, the grant
of certiorari and consequent designation of the circuit of origin
depend upon serendipitous variables that simple affirm / reverse
231. The Seventh Circuit’s abrogation rate of 79% in bankruptcy cases
over thirty-two years is 139% of the aggregate mean of 56.97% for bankruptcy
cases from all circuits. The Seventh Circuit’s abrogation rate of 46% in Roberts
Court cases over seven years is 84% of the aggregate mean of 55.10% for
Roberts Court overall cases from all circuits. See supra Tables III, IV. No
significance can be attributed to the fact that the Ninth Circuit’s abrogation
rate exceeds the mean under both datasets because the deviation in the
bankruptcy dataset is not statistically significant. p=0.3592. See supra note
218 and accompanying text.
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rates do not capture. These include litigants’ and the Court’s
selection discretion, factual nuance, and the order in which the
circuits ruled on an issue. The Study this Article reports finds
that this chaotic process results in affirm / reverse rates
(considering only the circuit of origin) that differ significantly
from approve / abrogate rates (considering circuit of origin and
sleeper circuits). Consequently, any comparison of the circuits’
performance before the Court must account for circuit splits by
incorporating sleeper circuit data in a comprehensive and
meaningful way.
Nevertheless, one cannot draw valid conclusions regarding
Supreme Court / circuit court accord merely by replacing affirm
/ reverse rates with approve / abrogate rates. A valid measure of
accord must also control for the existence of and interaction
among other critical variables, including issue disparity, circuit
size, numbers of cases, and variation over time. Chief among
these may be the problem of issue disparity, which interacts
with and complicates each of the other variables. Comparing the
circuits’ relative performance based upon any measure that
aggregates disparate issues compares apples to bananas if: (i)
different circuits send the Court different types of issues, and (ii)
the Court inherently disagrees with the lower courts more
frequently on certain types of issues as compared to others
(perhaps relating to whether review was discretionary, and
whether the law is neutral, evolving, controversial or
ideological).
The preliminary evidence this Study reports shows
significant differences in the patterns of accord between the
Court and the circuits in single topic datasets as compared to
aggregated topic datasets. These patterns reveal themselves
incidental to this Study’s focus on reversal rates. Consequently,
more targeted studies are necessary to focus specifically on the
implications of issue disparity, to determine how issue
aggregation affects apparent rates of accord between the Court
and the circuits, and to understand how issue disparity
intersects with other factors such as the reason the Court
granted review. Until these intersections are explored, Supreme
Court reversal statistics will remain as diaphanous and
deceptive as the mist.
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Finally, the problems this Study reveals regarding reversal
rate data lead inevitably to two questions: (i) do publication and
examination of Supreme Court reversal rates serve any valid
purpose, and (ii) if so, should publication of reversal rates be
accompanied by caveats warning readers against misapplication
of the data?
Reversal rate data may reveal something about the Court’s
role in correcting errors, but only in a context that recognizes
and controls for the variety of roles Supreme Court review serves
(such as resolving circuit splits). Typically, however,
commentators misapply reversal rate data to compare the circuit
courts’ relative performance before the Court rather than to
explore error-correction. As a measure of Supreme Court / circuit
court accord, reversal rate data suffer from the streetlight
effect232 of being easy to locate, but invalid to answer the
question presented. At best, researchers may innocently leap
from reversal rate statistics to unwarranted conclusions
regarding Supreme Court / circuit court accord, and to
unsupportable inferences regarding the reasons for supposed
patterns of discord. At worst, some commentators may
conveniently employ reversal statistics to justify pre-existing
biases.233
To obviate these concerns, responsible publishers concerned
with the misuse of Supreme Court reversal statistics should
consider including prominent caveats noting the limited
purposes for which reversal rate data are reported, and
232. Data that are not valid for the purposes to which they are applied
may be harmful, rather than simply worthless, because they contribute to
actions and beliefs based upon erroneous “facts.” For explorations of the often
repeated tale of a person searching under a streetlamp for something he lost
elsewhere, see Evan Esar, “Did You Lose the Keys Here?” “No, But the Light Is
Much
Better
Here.”
QUOTE
INVESTIGATOR
(Apr.
11,
2013),
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/04/11/better-light/; David H. Freedman,
Why Scientific Studies Are So Often Wrong: The Streetlight Effect, DISCOVER
MAG. (Dec. 10, 2010), http://discovermagazine.com/2010/jul-aug/29-whyscientific-studies-often-wrong-streetlight-effect#.UdMyg1KhNsE (discussing
how the “streetlight effect” can lead to invalid scientific studies).
233. See Eisenberg, Origins, supra note 4, at 1736-37 (noting how the
absence of reliable data allows self-interested parties to promote biased data);
see also Wermiel, Ninth Circuit, supra note 69, at 362-65 (discussing popular
perception and the media’s role in fomenting the Ninth Circuit’s reputation;
citing examples); Chemerinsky, supra note 72, at 1 (discussing public
perceptions).
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expressly disclaiming the applicability of these data to the
question of Supreme Court/circuit court accord, absent control
for circuit splits, issue disparity, circuit size and other critical
variables.
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